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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Computer and network security has recently become a popular subject due to the
explosive growth of the Internet and the migration of commerce practices to the
electronic medium. We started to buy goods online, bank online, conduct business
and financial transactions and send messages world-wide. Thus, the authenticity and
privacy of the information transmitted and the data stored on networked computers
is of utmost importance.
The deployment of network security procedures requires the implementation of
cryptographic functions. More specifically, these include encryption, decryption, au-
thentication, digital signature algorithms and message-digest functions.Software
implementations of these algorithms are often desired because of their flexibility and
cost effectiveness. However, performance has always been the most critical charac-
teristic of a cryptographic function that determines its effectiveness, requiring the
algorithm engineer to invent and develop new methods for high-speed implementa-
tions.
In this thesis, we concentrate on developing high-speed algorithms and architec-
tures for number theoretic cryptosystems. Our work is mainly focused on implement-
ing elliptic curve cryptosystems efficiently, which requires space- and time-efficient
implementations of arithmetic operations over finite fields. Since longer bit lengths
are required for better security, efficient arithmetic over finite fields with high order
will serve our purpose.
We introduce new methods for arithmetic operations over finite fields. Method-
ologies such as precomputation, residue number system representation, and parallel2
computation are adopted to obtain efficient algorithms that are applicable on a va-
riety of cryptographic systems and subsystems.
We choose to work on finite fields of characteristic two that has high order,
mainly because they are easier to implement in hardware and software, and longer
bit lengths provide better security.
We basically try to invent and improve algorithms to manage fast arithmetic
operations in finite fields of characteristic two, i.e., Galois field GF(2k). Some of the
algorithms can also be used in finite fields with different characteristics. We pre-
fer polynomial representation, because combined with characteristic two, addition
and subtraction then become equivalent and can easily be performed on the corre-
sponding terms of polynomials using bit-wise XOR operations. Since the efficiency of
exponentiation inherently depends on the efficiency of multiplication, the main issue
is then to manage multiplication efficiently, which is usually followed by a reduc-
tion. Therefore, in this thesis, we mainly focused on multiplication algorithms and
architectures.
Since arithmetic operations in finite fields also have applications in coding theory
and computer algebra, the methods proposed in this thesis are applicable to these
applications as well.
Chapters 2 through 8 provides the background necessary to understand the moti-
vation and the contents of the contributions made, which are presented in Chapters 9
through 12. A brief description of each chapter is as follows:
Chapter 2 provides a brief introduction to cryptography and to the terminology
commonly used. It also explores different types of cryptographic systems commonly
used, and summarizes the basic ideas on which these systems are built. Strong and
weak points of the systems are also presented to able to compare the level of security
they provide.
Chapter 3 includes the definitions related to the elliptic curves. It mainly de-
scribes how a set of points on an elliptic curve form an Abelian group, and how to
manage the group operations on this set. The general group structure, the procedures
to find the order of the curve, and the theorems about the upper and lower bounds3
of the order are also presented in this chapter. Finally elliptic curves constructed
over rings, along with the cryptosystems they yield, are discussed.
Chapter 4 explains how the elliptic curves are classified according to the char-
acteristics of the underlying finite field and the security they provide. Simplified
addition formulas are derived for each case. Using the relations between the order
and the structure of the Abelian groups, it was possible to classify all the elliptic
curves into a small number of isomorphism classes, which are then listed in a table,
with the structure and the order found for each class.
In Chapter 5, we present the discrete logarithm problem in finite fields and
described the algorithms found to date, to solve it. Then the elliptic curve logarithm
problem is presented and it is compared to the discrete logarithm problem. It is also
shown that for some classes of elliptic curves, the elliptic curve logarithm problem
reduces to the discrete logarithm problem in a finite field, and hence these curves
provide no extra security. The results and the reduction parameters for each class
are summarized in a table.
In Chapter 6, the implementation issues such as which curve to select, how to
count the order of a curve and how to implement an elliptic curve cryptosystem
are discussed. Results of some previous implementations are summarized. We also
present an algorithm to find the order, which we built using Schoof's original paper.
Chapter 7 summarizes other uses of the elliptic curves, such as primality testing
and factorization. The known primality testing methods are presented and compared
to that of elliptic curves'.
Chapter 8 provides an introduction to arithmetic operations in finite fields. It
presents different notations and technics used to represent field elements and manage
field arithmetic. The algorithms and methods presented in later chapters assume the
notations and technics presented in this chapter.
In Chapter 9, a new table lookup based reduction method for performing the
modular reduction operation is proposed. This method can be used to obtain fast
software implementations of the finite field multiplication and squaring operations.
The reduction algorithm has both left-to-right and right-to-left versions, which re-4
spectively improve the standard and Montgomery multiplication methods. Further-
more, it is shown that the right-to-left version of the proposed reduction method also
works in the integer case, if the modulus n is an odd number.
In Chapter 10, a novel method of parallelization of the multiplication operation in
GF(2k) is presented for an arbitrary value of k and arbitrary irreducible polynomial
n(x) generating the field. The parallel algorithm is based on the polynomial residue
number system. The parallel algorithm receives the residue representations of the
input operands (elements of the field) and produces the result in its residue form,
however, it is guaranteed that the degree of this polynomial is less than k, i.e., it is
an element of the field, properly reduced by the irreducible polynomial n(x).
In Chapter 11, we propose a new formulation of the multiplication matrix and an
architecture for the multiplication operation in GF(2m). The proposed architecture
generalizes the Mastrovito multiplication, and is particularly efficient when applied
to a specific class of polynomials that is known in advance, as it uses all possible
optimizations. We have studied all such cases in detail, and obtained space and time
complexities, and furthermore, provided actual design examples.
Chapter 12 concludes the thesis with the summary of the results, contributions
and discussions.
Appendix A includes the list of notations and definitions used in the thesis.
In Appendix B and Appendix C, we provide some of the algorithms and theorems
referred or used during the presentation of methods throughout the thesis.
Appendix D includes some short notes on finite fields that can be used to refresh
the knowledge on finite fields, before reading Chapter 8.
Finally, we also provide a rich index for the convenience of the reader.5
Chapter 2
CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS
2.1Introduction
The fundamental goal of cryptography has historically been to achieve privacy, i.e.,
to enable two people to send each other messages over an insecure channel in such
a way that only the intended recipient can read (or understand) the message. This
objective has traditionally been met by using private key cryptosystems. As will be
explained in the following sections this system has some disadvantages that make
it unsuitable for use in certain applications.Public key cryptosystems overcome
the key distribution and management problems inherent with private key systems.
And elliptic curves offer more security using smaller bandwidth, which make them
important.
2.2Private Key Cryptography
Let M denote the set of all possible plaintext messages, C the set of all possible
ciphertext messages and /C the set of all possible keys.
A private key cryptosystem consists of a family of pairs of functions
Ek:M -+CandDk:C-4M k E 1C,
such that
Dk(Ek(m)) = m for all m E M and k E K.
To use such a system, the two users must initially agree upon a secret key k E K.
They can do this by physically meeting, but this can be impractical or sometimes
even impossible, or they might use the services of a trusted courier.Besides the
problem of availability, the secureness of the courier is still questionable.6
The main disadvantages of the private key cryptosystems are:
1. Key distribution problem (a secure channel may not be available)
2. Key management problem (if the number of pairs (of users) is large then the
number of keys becomes unmanageable)
3. No signatures possible
A digital signature is an electronic analogue of a hand-written signature that
allows a receiver to convince a third party that the message is in fact originated from
the sender.
In one-time pad method, the keys are random binary strings and a message is
encrypted by XOR'ing the key to it, one bit at a time. This system is secure but
requires a key as long as the message itself.
2.3Public Key Cryptography
In 1976, W. Diffie and M. Hellman invented public key cryptography to address the
deficiencies in private key cryptography, stated in the previous section [10]. Their
protocol is known as Diffie-Hellman key exchange. And in terms of an arbitrary
group it can be described as:
1. (Setup) A and B publicly select a (multiplicatively written) finite group G and
an element a E G.
2. A generates a random integer a, computes aa in G, and transmits aa to B over
a public communications channel.
3. B generates a random integer b, computes ab in G, and transmits ab to A over
a public communications channel.
4. A receives ab and computes (ab)a.
5. B receives aa and computes (aa)b.7
A and B now share the common group element aab. Note that an eavesdropper
knows G,a,aa and ab, and his task is to use this information to reconstruct aab. This
problem is commonly referred to as Diffie-Hellman problem.
The problem of computing a, given G, a and as is called the discrete logarithm
problem.It has not been proven but widely believed that the discrete logarithm
problem and the Diffie-Hellman problem are computationally equivalent [46].
2.3.1Trapdoor One-way Functions
Easy-hard : We will use the term hard to mean computationally infeasible, i.e., infea-
sible using the best known algorithms and best available technology. In terms
of software engineering only, easy and hard will mean requiring polynomial and
exponential time, respectively.
One-way function : An invertible function f : M C, such that Vm E M it is
easy to compute f (m), but for most cC it is hard to compute f-1(m). There
is no function that is proven to be a one-way function, but there are some
candidates.
Trapdoor one-way function : A one-way function that can be efficiently inverted by
using some extra information. The extra information is called the trapdoor.
A public key cryptosystem is constructed using a family fk : M C, k E IC,
of trapdoor one-way functions. The trapdoors t(k) should be easy to obtain for all
k E K. Also an efficient algorithm is needed to find fk, but knowing it, should not
lead one to any information that will make it feasible to recover k (and thus t(k)).
If these conditions are satisfied then each user U selects a random key u E 1C and
publishes the algorithm Au, his public key, for computing fu. Then the trapdoor
t(u), which is used to invert fu, will be the user's private key. Any message m is
encrypted to fu(m) using Au, and only the .user U can find out m from fu(m), as
only he knows t(u) to invert fu. To use digital signatures we assume A4 = C [46].8
The group order and exponentiation are two commonly used trapdoor one-way
functions. RSA and elliptic curves over the ring Zn uses group order as a trapdoor
one-way function, and ElGamal Cryptosystem uses exponentiation. Now we will
further explain these systems.
Suppose that for the group G, multiplication is easy and finding its order is hard.
Then we can construct a public key cryptosystem whose trapdoor one-way function
is based on the difficulty of finding group order. Each user chooses a group G (with
order n) and a random integer e such that gcd(e, n) = 1 and computes (using the
extended Euclidean Algorithm) an integer d, 1 < d < n1, such that
ed 1(mod n).
A's public key consists of the group G and the integer e. To send the message m to
A, one computes and sends me. A can recover m using d since (me)d = m.
Exponentiation in a multiplicatively written finite group can be performed effi-
ciently by repeated square-and-multiply method, if an efficient way to compute the
product is known. Similarly, multiplication in an additively written finite group can
be performed efficiently by repeated double-and-add method, if an efficient way to
compute the addition is known.
2.3.2RSA Cryptosystem
The RSA cryptosystem was invented in 1977 by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [60]
and was the first realization of Diffie-Hellman's abstract model for public key cryp-
tography.
To set up this system each user picks two large primes p and q and computes
their product n = pq. The group used is G = Z. It is well known that the order of
G is
0(n) 1)(q1).
The public key is the pair of integers (n, e) and the private key is d. The problem
of computing 0(n) using only n is computationally equivalent to the problem of9
factoring n, which is believed to be hard (but not proven). Thus the security of the
RSA is based on the factoring problem.
2.3.3ElGamal Cryptosystem
In 1985, T. ElGamal [11] proposed a public key scheme based on discrete exponen-
tiation, which exhibits the properties of a trapdoor one-way function.
1. (Setup) A finite group G and element a E G are chosen. Each user picks a
random integer 1 (the private key) and makes public at (the public key). We
suppose that messages are elements of G and that user A wishes to send a
message m to user B.
2. A generates a random integer k and computes ak.
3. A looks up B's public key ab, and computes (ab)k and mabk.
4. A sends to B the pair of group elements (ak, mabk).
5. B computes (ak)b and uses this to recover m.
Clearly, the security of the ElGamal cryptosystem and the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange are equivalent, and hence the security of the ElGamal cryptosystem is
based on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem. EIGamal [11] also designed
a signature scheme, which makes use of the group G [46].
2.3.4Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
When an elliptic curve is defined over a finite field, the points on the curve form an
Abelian group. The addition operation in this group is "easy" to implement, both in
hardware and software. The discrete logarithm problem in this group is believed (but
not proven) to be very "hard",in particular harder than the one defined in finite fields
of the same size. It was for this reason that the elliptic curves were first suggested in
1985 by N. Koblitz [27] and V. Miller [48] for implementing public key cryptosystems.10
Elliptic curves over finite fields can be used to implement the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange, and the EIGamal cryptosystem. Also they can replace trapdoor one-way
functions in any system. These systems potentially provide the same security as
the existing public key cryptosystems, but uses shorter key lengths. Having shorter
key lengths mean smaller bandwidth and memory requirements, which is a crucial
factor in some applications such as design of smart cards, where both memory and
processing power is limited. Another advantage of using the elliptic curves is that
each user may select a different curve, even though the underlying field is the same
for all. That means each user can change his curve periodically (for extra security)
without changing the hardware [46].11
Chapter 3
ELLIPTIC CURVES
3.1Basic Definitions
Elliptic curves can be defined over any field (e.g.real, complex, finite), but for
cryptographic purposes we will only be concerned with those over finite fields [29].
Let H be a field and H be its algebraic closure (see Appendix A). Then an Elliptic
Curve E is the set of solutions of the (Weierstrass) equation
y2 + aixy + a3y= x3 + a2X
2± a4x + as, (3.1)
in the affine plane H x H, together with the point at infinity 0.
If al, a2, a3, a4, as E H,then E is said to be defined over H and denoted by
E I H. The set of H-rational points of E, denoted E(H), is the set of points both of
whose coordinates lie in H, including the point 0.
3.2Group Law
The points on an elliptic curve form an Abelian group under a certain addition, with
identity 0. Negative of a point P is denoted by P and is defined to be the point
with the same x-coordinate. First we will define the operations intuitively: If a line
intersects an elliptic curve at more than one point, then it intersects it at exactly
3 points, counting the multiplicities (When there are less than 3 finite points, it is
assumed that the rest of the intersections are at infinity, i.e., at the point 0) [26].
Then the sum of any two points is defined to be the negative of the third intersection
of the elliptic curve with the line through these two points. For a nice geometrical
introduction to elliptic curves see [66].12
Now we can explicitly state the addition rules for all P,Q E E as follows:
1. 0 P = P and P + 0 = P (0 is the identity element).
2. 0 = 0.
3. If P = (x1, Yi) 0 0, then P = (x1, Y1aixia3).
4. If Q = P, then P +Q = 0.
5. If P0, Q0, Q # P, then let R be the third point of intersection
(counting multiplicities) of either the line PQ if PQ, or the tangent line to
the curve at P if P = Q, with the curve. Then P + Q = R.
If P = (xi, Yi) Q= (x2, y2) and R = (x3, Y3) then :
and
where
A
x3 = A2 + aiAa2xix2
y3 = (A + ai)x3 a3,
Y2 -Y1
x2
34+2a2x1 +a4aiyi
2yi +al x1 +a3
if P Q,
Theorem 3.1 ([46]) (E, +) is an Abelian group with the identity element 0. If E
is defined over H, then E(H) is a subgroup of E.
3.3Group Structure
There are many analogies between the group of Fq-rational points on an elliptic curve
and the multiplicative group F;: approximately same number of elements, etc. But
for a single (large) q there are many different elliptic curves and many different N to
choose from. Hence elliptic curves offer a rich source of "naturally occurring" finite
Abelian groups. It is this major advantage that makes elliptic curves attractive for
cryptography [26].13
Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fq. Let q = pk,where p (a prime) is the
characteristic of Fq. The number of points in E(Fq) is called the order of the curve
E(Fq) and denoted by #E(Fq). Then we have:
Theorem 3.2 (Hasse,[65]) Let #E(Fq) = q +1t. Then5_ 21/4.
An important consequence of Hasse's Theorem is that we can pick points P
uniformly and randomly on an elliptic curve E(Fq) in probabilistic polynomial time.
The next result, proven by Waterhouse, determines the possible values for the
order #E(Fq) as E varies over all elliptic curves defined over Fq, where q = pk.
Theorem 3.3 ([46]) There exists an elliptic curve E I Fq such that E(Fq) has an
order q +1 t over Fq if and only if one of the following conditions holds:
(i) t0 (mod p) and t2 < 4q.
(ii) k is odd and one of the followings holds:
I. t = 0.
2. t2 =2q and p = 2.
3. t2 = 3q and p = 3.
(iii) k even and one of the followings holds:
1. t2 = 4q.
2. t2 = q and p 01 (mod 3).
3. t= 0 and p 0 1 (mod 4).
The following theorem is due to Deuring:
Theorem 3.4 ([59]) Every integer in the interval (p +12\f-p,p + 1 + 21/7p) is
attained as #E(Fp) for some choice of (a, b) E Fr x Fr with 4a327b2 0 0.14
As, E varies over all elliptic curves over Fq, the values #E(Fq) are nearly uni-
formly distributed in the interval of size 05 centered at p + 1.This statement
is made precise by the following theorem, which was a key ingredient in Lenstra's
elliptic curve algorithm for factoring integers (see Appendix B.5) [36].
Theorem 3.5 ([46, 35]) There exist positive effectively computable constants c1
and c2 such that for each prime p > 5 and for any subset S of integers in the
interval [p + 1 .175, p + 1 + the probability r, of a random pair (a, b) E Fr x Fp
defining an elliptic curve E : y2 = x3 + a4x + a5 with #E(Fq) E S is bounded as
follows:
#S2 #S ci (log p)-1 < r, < c2 (log p) (log log p)2.
2 [A + 1 2 [A + 1
For the next theorem we will need some standard results from Abelian group
theory. Every finite Abelian group G can be decomposed into a direct sum of cyclic
groups
G= Zni ED Zn, 83 ED Zn.,
where ni±ifor all i = 1,2,... , s1, and ns > 2. Furthermore this decomposition
is unique. We say that G is an Abelian group of type (n1, n2,..,ns) and rank s.
Theorem 3.6 ([46]) E(Fq) is an Abelian group of rank 1 or 2.The type of the
group is (n1, n2), i.e., E(Fq)Z7,1 ED Zn where n2 and furthermore n2lq1.
The curve E can also be viewed as an elliptic curve over any extension field
L = Fr of Fq; E(Fq) is a subgroup of E(L). The Weil Theorem enables one to
compute #E(Fqm), for m > 2, from #E(Fq) as follows:
Theorem 3.7 (Weil,[46]) Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fq, and let t =
q + 1#E(Fq). Then
#E (Fqm) = gm + 1am ,
where a, 6 are complex numbers determined from the factorization of
1tT + q712 = (1aT)(1.OT).15
Now we state a few results on the group structure of E = E(Fq). E is a torsion
group, i.e., for each point P E E there is a positive integer k such that kP = 0.
The smallest such integer is called the order of the point P. An n-torsion point is a
point P E E(rq) satisfying nP = 0. Let E(Fq)[n] denote the subgroup of n-torsion
points in E(Fq), where n0. We will write E[n] for E(Fq)[n]. In the algebraic
number theory of elliptic curves, one finds a deep analogy between the coordinates
of the n-torsion points on an elliptic curve and the n-division points on the unit circle
(which are the nth roots of unity in the complex plane [29]). If n and q are relatively
prime, then E[n]ZnZ. Division polynomials are recursively defined set of
polynomials that helps one to identify the n-torsion points or to compute nP using
P [46]. As will be seen later in Section 6.4, they are basically used in determining
the order of a curve.
3.4Elliptic Curves Over Rings
Elliptic curves over the ring Zn are used in Lenstra's integer factoring algorithm (see
Appendix B.5) [36] and the Goldwasser-Kilian primality proving algorithm [15].
Let n be a positive integer with gcd(n, 6) = 1. An elliptic curve over Zn is given
by an equation
Ea,b:y2=x3+ax+b,
where a, b E Z and gcd(4a3 + 27b2) = 1. If n is a product of 2 primes p and q, then
points on
Ea,b(Zn) = Ea,b(Fp) x Ea,b(Fq)
can be computed using Ea,b(Zn), i.e., without knowing p & q, and any failure leads
to the factorization n = pq [46].
A cryptosystem can be proposed based on the above ideas (See [46] for a de-
scription). Like the RSA the security of that system is based on the difficulty of
factoring n, however it is not known whether breaking the system is equivalent to
factoring n. Although the system is not as efficient as RSA, it has the advantage that
it appears to be resistant to some of the known attacks on RSA. See [33] for more16
details. In [52], Okamoto, Fujioka and Fujisaki propose a practical digital signature
scheme based on elliptic curves over Zn, where n= p2q. The scheme appears to be
several times faster than the RSA signature scheme.17
Chapter 4
CLASSIFICATION & ANALYSIS OF ELLIPTIC CURVES
4.1Isomorphic Curves
Two elliptic curves are said to be isomorphic if they are isomorphic as projective
varieties. Two projective varieties V1 and V2 defined over a field H, are isomorphic
over H, if there exists morphisms 0 and O defined over H, such that
0 : VI. V2, 0 : V2 VI
and both 0 o 0 and 0 o 0 are identity maps on V1 and V2, respectively.
Theorem 4.1 ([46]) Two elliptic curves, _Ell H and E2I H,given by the equations
El : y2 + aixy + a3y=x3 ± a2X
2+ a4x + as
E2 : y2 + aixy + if/3y=x3 + 23x2 + F24x + C/6
are isomorphic over H, denoted by .E1 1H L-' E2 / H, if and only if there exist u, r, s, t
E H, u0, such that the change of variables
(x, y) -+ (u2 x + r, u3 y + u2 s x + t)
transforms equation El into equation E2. Furthermore when Ell H Li E2 /H holds,
_Ell H andE2IH are also isomorphic as Abelian groups. The relationship of isomor-
phism is an equivalence relation.
The change of variables in above theorem is referred to as an admissible change
of variables.Table 4.1. EC Equations and Addition Formulas for Char(H) = 2
Elliptic Curve EquationP -1- Q Coordinates
y2 + x3+a2x2as
(ai0)
P 0 Q
)2yl+y2 (yi+y2 x3 +x1 +x2+a2 +
xi+x2 / xi+X2
Y3=(X11++X22 )(xi +x3) + x3 +Y1
P =Q
2 ,
I' X3=Xi
xi
y3= x?+ (xi +1+21-x0x3
y2+a3y=x3+a4x+a6
(al= 0)
0P Q
Y141/2)2 x3 + X1 + X2 (x,+x2
( Yl +Y2 \ y3= ) X1 ±X3)+a3+ Yi (
xi-rx2
P = Q
xi+a4
x3 2a3
. \ xl-r2, ai
y3 ) (xi ±X3)±a3+ Yi a3
4.2Curves over Fields with Different Characteristics
Let
E2 : y2 +diXya3y = X3 ± a2X2 CL4Xa6
18
be the general elliptic curve equation. When we specify the characteristic of the
underlying field, this equation transforms into simpler forms that are isomorphic to
it. For example for Char(H) = 3, it simplifies to:
y2= X3a2x
2±a4x±as
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 summarize the cases for Char(H) = 2 and Char(H) 0 2, 3
respectively, along with the coordinates of the sum P + Q =(x3, y3)of two points
P = (xi, Yi) and Q =(x2, Y2)on the given curve [46].
Elliptic curves over finite fields with Char(H) = 2, i.e., GF(2k), is particularly
interesting. The arithmetic operations for the underlying field are easy to construct
and relatively simple to implement. These systems have shown the potential to
provide small and low-cost public key cryptosystems. Therefore, we will concentrate
on these fields.19
Table 4.2. EC Equations and Addition Formulas for Char(H) 02,3
Elliptic Curve EquationP -.11- Q x3 y3
y2x3+a4x+ P 0 Q
,,2
Y2 Y2 2X)Y1
X2y1
)
X1x2 (X1 (X
)
(x1x3) Y1
P =Q
(3 x+a 42 ti-a4\f
22yi k x2(L2y1)kx1X3)yi
4.3Singular vs. Non-singular Elliptic Curves
Let F(x, y) = 0 be the implicit equation for y as a function of x in Equation (3.1).
A point on the curve is said to be non-singular (or a smooth point) if at least one of
the partial derivatives aF/ax, aF/ay is nonzero at that point. If both of the partial
derivatives are zero, then the point is called singular.If a curve has no singular
points, then it is called non-singular elliptic curve, otherwise it is called a singular
elliptic curve. The condition for the cubic on the right of the elliptic curve equations
in Table4.1 & 4.2,not to have multiple roots, is equivalent to require all points on
the curve to be non-singular[29].
4.4The Discriminant and j-Invariant
Let E be the elliptic curve given by the Equation (3.1). Define the following quan-
tities:
d2 = ai4a2
c/4= 2a4 + al a3
d6 =a234a6
2 2 d8 = al a64a2a8aia3a4 + a2a3a4
C4 = d224d4
A =4d884274 +9d2d4d6
j(E) = 41020
The quantity A is called the discriminant of the elliptic curve equation, while
j(E) is called the j-invariant of E if A0.
Theorem 4.2 ([46]) E is an elliptic curve, i.e., the Elliptic Curve Equation (3.1)
is non-singular, if and only if A0.
Theorem 4.3 ([46]) If two elliptic curves Ell H and E2I H are isomorphic over H,
then j(Ei) = j(E2). The converse is also true if H is an algebraically closed field.
4.5supersingular vs. Non-supersingular Elliptic Curves
The elliptic curve E is said to be supersingular if p divides t, where #E(Fq) = q+1t.
Otherwise it is called non-supersingular. It is well-known that if p = 2 or if p = 3,
then E is supersingular if and only if j(E) = 0.For Char(H) = 2, j-invariant
simplifies to j(E) = ar/A, so j(E) = 0 if and only if al = 0. Thus curves in the
first row of the Table 4.1 are non-supersingular and the ones in the second row are
supersingular. In Theorem 3.3, case (i) shows the non-supersingular curves and cases
(ii) & (iii) show the supersingular ones. From that theorem we can easily deduce the
following:
Corollary 4.4 ([46]) Let E be defined over Fq. Then E is supersingular if and only
if t2 = 0, q,2q,3q, 4q.
If E is a supersingular curve, then the group structure of E(Fq) is determined
by the next result.
Lemma 4.5 ([63]) Let #E(Fq) = q+ 1t.
(i) If t2 = q, 2q, 3q, then E(Fq) is cyclic.
(ii) If t2 = 4q, thenE(Fq)
(iii) If t = 0, then E(Fq) r-=-1
ED
zv4+, e
ift = 2.14-
ift = 2.14
cyclic ifq3 (mod 4)
Z(q+1)/2 ED Z2 or cyclic ifq3 (mod 4)21
We can deduce the following Theorem immediately from Theorem 3.6, which
determines all possible groups E(Fq) that occur as E varies over all non-supersingular
curves defined over Fq.
Theorem 4.6 ([61, 70]) If r is a prime, then let vr(n) be the largest integer with
rvp(n) In. Let N = #E(Fq) = q +1t, where t0 (mod p) and t2 < 4q. If ar,br
are integers which satisfy a,. > br, a,. + b,. = vr(N), and b,. < vr(q 1) for each prime
rp, then there exists a non-supersingular curve E defined over Fq such that E(Fq)
has group structure
z/pvP(N) ®® (zirar ® z/rar) .
rOp
Also, if N = #E(Fq) factors as a product of distinct primes, then E(Fq) is cyclic.
If n = pe, then either E[pe]{O} if E is supersingular, or else EV] L-1 .ape if E
is non-supersingular.
4.6Isomorphism Classes of Elliptic Curves
In this section, the isomorphism classes of elliptic curves over finite fields H will
be counted. For the case H = F2k, a representative from each class will be listed.
#E(F2k) for each supersingular curve E defined over F2k, will be determined using
Weil's Theorem (Theorem 3.7). The group type of the curves may subsequently be
determined using Lemma 4.5.
Theorem 4.7 ([46]) The number of isomorphism classes of elliptic curves over Fq,
with Char(Fq) > 3, is 2q+6, 2q+2, 2q+4, 2q, for q -r=2 1,5, 7,11 (mod 12) respectively.
Theorem 4.8 ([46]) There are 2(2k1) isomorphism classes of non-supersingular
elliptic curves over F2k. Let 7 be an element of F2k, such that Tr(7) =1 (if k is odd,
we can take 7 = 1). A set of representatives of the isomorphism classes is:
{ y2+ xy = x3 + a2x2 + as a6 E F2k, a2 E10,71}22
Theorem 4.9 ([46]) There are 3 and 7 isomorphism classes of supersingular curves
over F2k, where k is odd and even respectively. For the k-odd case, let 7 be a non-cube
in F2k,and let a, 0, (5, w E F2k be such that
Tr(7-2a) = 1,Tr(7-4 [3)= 1,T e(8) 0 0and Tr(w) = 1.
Then a representative from each class is as shown in Table 4.3, along with the number
of points and group types. (The k values will be explained later)
Given an arbitrary supersingular elliptic curve E over F2k, we can compute
#E(F2k) by first determining to which isomorphism class E belongs. Then we can
use the results in the Table 4.3 to determine #E(F2k). Several efficient polynomial
time algorithms to find the isomorphism class of a curve can be found in [3].23
Table 4.3. Isomorphism classes of supersingular ECs over the field F2k
Curve E k #E(F2k) Group Typem
y2 x3 odd q + 1 cyclic 2
y2 + y = x3 + x k :.=-_. 1, 7 (mod 8)q + 1 + \/24 cyclic 4
k ---._3, 5 (mod 8)q + 1\/' cyclic 4
y2 + y = x3 + x + 1ka-1,7 (mod 8)q + 1-12q cyclic 4
k a 3, 5 (mod 8)q + 1 + ./ 2q cyclic 4
y2 + 'yy = x3 k0 (mod 4)q + 1 + /q cyclic 3
k z_-=. 2 (mod 4)q+ 1 ./4 cyclic 3
y2 + 'yy = x3 + ak a- 0 (mod 4)q + 1Ng, cyclic 3
k a- 2 (mod 4)q+ 1+ Afq cyclic 3
y2 + ,y2yx3 k a-.- 0 (mod 4)q + 1 + Afi cyclic 3
k FE 2 (mod 4)q+ 1 /4, cyclic 3
y2 + 72y = x3 + 0k a_-- 0 (mod 4)q + 1.14 cyclic 3
k a_-- 2 (mod 4)q +1+ Aid cyclic 3
y2+y=x3+68x k even q + 1 cyclic 2
y2 +y =x3 k -0 (mod 4)q + 12\fiZ/_1 ED .Z,g_i1
k E.-- 2 (mod 4)q + 1 + V4z,fi+, ®z,4+1 1
y = x3 + co k :_-,- 0 (mod 4)q + 1 + 2.14,.Z,g+i e .z,+i1
k a 2 (mod 4)q + 12.V4Z\/4_1 ED .Z.v4_1124
Chapter 5
THE ELLIPTIC CURVE LOGARITHM PROBLEM
5.1Discrete Logarithm Problem
Let G be a (multiplicatively written) finite cyclic group of order n, a be a generator
for G and )3 E G. The discrete logarithm of /3 to the base a, denoted by logs /3, is
the unique integer v, 0 < v < n, such that /3 = au. The discrete logarithm problem
(DLP), is to find an 'easy' (i.e., computationally feasible) method for computing
logarithms in a given group G.It is also referred to as the discrete-log problem.
Brief descriptions of the known methods and algorithms are as follows:
5.1.1Linear Search Method
Computing the successive powers of a until Q is found.
5.1.2Square Root Methods
5.1.2.1Baby-Step Giant-Step
Let u = .Observe that if v = logesthen we can uniquely write v = ju +
where 0 < i < u. Precompute a list of pairs (i, ai) for 0 < i < u and sort this list
by second component. For each j, 0 < j < u, compute ,6a -ju and check (by binary
search) if this element is equal to the second component of some pair in the list. If
fia-ju = ai for some i, 0 < i < u, then= alu+i and hence loges g = jui. Note
that this method requires a table with u entries. [46].25
5.1.2.2Pollard p-method
J. Pollard [57] gave a method to find logarithms which is probabilistic but removes
the necessity of precomputing a list of logarithms.
Partition the group G into three sets S1, S2 and S3 of roughly equal size. (Some
restrictions apply, such as 1 0 S2.) Define a sequence of group elements v0, v1,v2,
by
Vi =
1
vi -1
2
avi_i
i = 0,
vi E S1,
vi E S2 7
vi E S3,
for i > 0. It easily follows that the sequence of group elements defines a sequence of
integers { ai} and {bi}, where
vi = 0°4 abi i > 0
a0 = b0=0
ai+i + 1,2ai or ai(mod n)
bi+irJbi, 2bi or bi + 1(mod n)
depending on which set (SI, S2 or S3) contains vi_1. Making use of Floyd's algorithm,
Pollard computes the six tuple (vi, b2i), i = 1,2,...until vi = v2i. At
this stage, we have
or
as
for raia21 and s^_' b2i (mod n).This gives
r logo s(mod n).
There are only d = gcd(r, n) possible values for logo fi.If d is small then each of
these possibilities can be enumerated to find the correct value.26
5.1.3Pohlig-Hellman Method
This method for computing logarithms in a cyclic group [56], takes advantage of the
factorization of the order of the group. Let
n = 1-1 piAi
i=1
where pi is a prime and Ai is a positive integer for each 1 < i < t. If v = loges 0, then
the approach is to determine v modulofor each i, 1 < i < t, and then use the
Chinese Remainder Theorem (see Appendix C) to compute v modulo n. We begin
by determining zv (mod pM. Suppose that
Ai -1
Z = E izipl,
i=0
where 0 < zi <Pi1. Let -y = an/Pi be a pith root of unity in G. Then
on/piavton,,v7
zo
Using one of the square root methods described in the previous section we determine
the logarithm of -yz° to the base 7 in the cyclic group of order pi in G. This gives us
z0. If Ai > 1, then to determine zi we consider
-.Z0r/Pi zip° niPT = Azi
Again zi can be found by a square root method. In this manner we can determine
all zi, 0 < i < Ai, and thus v modulo p" [46].
5.1.4Index Calculus Method
First we attempt to find the logarithms of the elements of a fixed subset F =
{71, 72, ,of G, called the factor base, as follows. We pick a random integer
s and attempt to write as as a product of elements in F:
as = 'Yf'z
i=127
If we succeed, then taking the logarithms of both sides of this equality we get the
linear congruence
s E ai loge, ryZ(mod n).
After collecting a sufficient number of relations in that form, one can then hopefully
solve for the indeterminates loge, ,yi, 1 < i < t.
In the second stage, we find loge, )3 as follows. Repeatedly pick random integers
s until as/3 can be written as a product of elements in F:
as = 'YIP
Taking the logarithm of both sides, we get
log Q = E bi loge, ryis(mod n). ti
The choice of the factor base determines the running time. An appropriate choice
of F will be a small set and at the same time the proportion of elements of G that
factor in F is large [41, 46].
For the field Fp, a practical method is the Gaussian integer method [7] and the
fastest one is the number field sieve [34] (although it appears to be impractical at
present). For the field F2k (or in general Fpk,where p is fixed [22]), we represent
the elements of F2k as polynomials in F2[x] of degree at most (k1), where the
multiplication is performed modulo a fixed irreducible polynomial of degree k in
F2 [X].The set F is then taken to be the set of all irreducible polynomials of degree
at most some prescribed bound b. To write as as a product of elements in F we
express it as a polynomial of degree at most (k1), and attempt to factor it in
F2[x] as a product of polynomials in F. The running time of this method (after
some improvements) is the subexponential time (see Appendix A) L[2", c, 1/3], where
1.3507 < c < 1.4047 [6]. The best algorithms for Fr and F2k with rigorously proved
running times are due to Pomerance [58]. For fields Fpk,the number field sieve is
the best algorithm known. Unfortunately it is still unknown whether there exist
subexponential algorithms (with either heuristically or rigorously proven running
times) for the DLP in fields where both q and k tend to infinity. The running times
of the above algorithms are compared at the Table 5.1 [46].28
Table 5.1. Comparison of methods that solve the discrete-log problem
Method Time
Linear Search 0(n)
Square Root
Methods
Baby-Step Giant-Step 0( IViT, log n)
Pollard p 0( ([VW )
Pohlig-Hellman 0(EL Ai (log n + N/pi log pi))
Index
Calculus
Methods
Gaussian integer (for Fr) 4,1,1/2]
Pomerance (for Fr) 4,4 1/2]
Number Field Sieve (for Fr) 1[p,3213,1/3]
Number Field Sieve (for Fpk) L:pk, c, 1/3] (c is const)
Pomerance (for F2k) L[2k, -4-, 1/2]
5.2Elliptic Curve Logarithm Problem
Let P E E(Fq) be a point of order n and
E(Fq)Z,iz,.
Also assume that n is known and gcd( #E(Fq), q1) = 1. Then the elliptic curve
logarithm problem (ECLP), is to determine the unique integer 1, such that R = lP,
provided that such an integer exist.
In the paper [43], A. Menezes, T. Okamoto and S. Vanstone showed that the
ECLP in E(Fq) can be reduced to the DLP in a finite field Fr, where E(Fq) has
type (n1, n2) and m is the smallest integer such that E(n1) C E(Fri), and hence
E(n) C E(Fez). Furthermore E(Fq...) has type (cni, cn2). In general the reduction
algorithm takes exponential time (in In q), but they proved that it takes probabilistic
polynomial time for supersingular curves. When combined with a subexponential
algorithms for the DLP in a finite field, this yields a probabilistic subexponential
time algorithm to compute the ECLPs for supersingular curves. This algorithm is29
Table 5.2. Parameters used in reducing supersingular ECLP to DLP
Class of curvetGroup Structure Comment rti m
I 0 cyclic q+ 1 2
II 0 Z(q+1)/2 ED Z2 q 1--,_- 3 (mod 4)(q + 1)/2 2
III ±74 cyclic k is even q+ 1+ V43
IV ±-124 cyclic p = 2, k is oddq + 1 T -127q4
V ±.\/ 3q cyclic p = 3, k is oddq + 1 T 04,6
VI ±2.14Z4i ED Z,gTi. k is even 74, + 1 1
Class of CurveType of E(Fq.) c
I (q+1,q+1) 1
II (q+1,q+1) 2
III ( / ± 1 ,/+ 1 ) +1
IV (q2 ± 1, q2 ± 1)q+.+1
V (q3 + 1,q3 + 1) (q + 1) (q ± \134 + 1)
VI (N/q± 1,f4± 1) 1
called the M 0 V attack. Thus, for supersingular curves, the ECLP is more tractable
than was previously believed. Table 5.2 summarizes the results [46]. The m values
for all isomorphism classes of supersingular elliptic curves over the finite field F2k
were indicated on Table 4.3 before.
If a non-supersingular curve is desired, then the curve must be chosen so that
the corresponding m value is sufficiently large. (By sufficiently large we mean m > c
values for which the DLP in Fq. is considered intractable)
Frey and Riick showed how to use a variant of the Tate pairing for Abelian
varieties over local fields, to reduce the ECLP in the n-torsion part of the divisor
class group of a projective irreducible non-singular curve over Fq (with char(Fq)30
coprime with n), to the DLP in Fqm, where m is the smallest integer such that
n1 (qm1). For elliptic curves, this method is advantageous over the above method
as the condition n1(qm 1) is usually weaker than the condition E(n) C E(Fen) [46].
5.3Group Structure
Miller [49] suggested an algorithm to find the type (ni, n2) of an elliptic curve E
defined over Fq in probabilistic polynomial time, given the factorization of N or
gcd(N, q1), where N = #E(Fq).31
Chapter 6
IMPLEMENTATION OF ELLIPTIC CURVE
CRYPTOSYSTEMS
6.1Advantages of Elliptic Curves
There are many analogies between the group of Fq-rational points on an elliptic curve
and the multiplicative group approximately same number of elements, etc. But
for a single (large) q there are many different elliptic curves and many different N to
choose from. Hence elliptic curves offer a rich source of "naturally occurring" finite
Abelian groups. It is this major advantage that makes elliptic curves attractive for
cryptography.
6.2Selecting a Curve
One of the most crucial steps in developing an elliptic curve cryptosystem, is selecting
the appropriate curve to use. Some elliptic curves are susceptible to attacks that
make them no more secure than existing systems today. Although not proven the
curves that has the following characteristics are believed to provide more security
than all the other systems in use [46]:
Non-supersingular (against MOV attack; see Section 5.2)
Large order (against square root methods; see Section 5.1.2)
The order is divisible by a large prime factor (against Pohlig-Hellman method;
see Section 5.1.3)
Optimal normal basis in the underlying field (for efficient finite field arithmetic;
see Section 8.2)
In addition to above, we will prefer a curve whose group is cyclic.32
6.3Counting Points on Elliptic Curves
We have seen in Section 6.2 that security of the Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem depends
on the curve selected, and some properties that its order should satisfy. So it is crucial
to know the order or else to find it.
One method of selecting curves is to choose a curve E defined over Fq, where
q is small enough so that #E(Fq) can be computed directly, and then using the
group E(Fen) for suitable m. Note that #E(Fqm) can be computed from #E(Fq) by
the Weil Theorem (Theorem 3.7). Observe also that if n divides m, then #E(Fqn)
divides #E(Fen), and so we should select n such that it is prime, or else a product
of a small factor and a large prime. But clearly the curve selected that way is not a
random one [46].
If a random elliptic curve is required, then the order of the curve should be
computed. In 1985, Schoof [62] presented a polynomial time algorithm for computing
#E(Fq), the number of Fq-rational points on an elliptic curve E defined over the field
Fq, where q is an odd prime. A step by step presentation of this algorithm, which
we constructed based on the above original paper, is presented in Section 6.4. The
algorithm has a running time of O(log8 q) bit operations, and is rather cumbersome
in practice. The algorithm basically uses endomorphisms and division polynomials.
Using fast multiplication technics it is possible to reduce the total running time
to 0(log8' q) bit operations, for any> 0, however since these technics are only
practical for very large q, there is still place for improvement. Buchmann and Muller
combined Schoof's algorithm with Shanks' baby-step giant-step algorithm, and were
able to compute orders of curves over 4, where p is a 27-decimal digit prime [46].
However, as explained before, from the point of view of practical cryptography
curves over fields of characteristic 2 are more important. For this reason, in [28]
Koblitz adapted Schoof's algorithm to curves over F2k and studied the implemen-
tation and security of a random curve cryptosystem. Using heuristic arguments,
Koblitz showed that if Wig, is a randomly chosen non-supersingular elliptic curve,
then the probability that N = #E(Fq) is divisible by a prime factor > NIB, is about33
log2(B/2). Thus, for example, the probability that the order ofa randomly chosen
non-supersingular curve over F2155 is divisible by a 40-digit prime is approximately
0.136, which means one can expect to try about 7 curves before a suitable one is
found [46].
Menezes, Vanstone and Zuccherato implemented a version of Schoof's algorithm
for curves over fields of characteristic 2, and used some heuristic arguments to im-
prove the running time, such as using Schank's baby-step giant-step method to man-
age modular arithmetic efficiently [44].In their implementation multiplying field
elements roughly takes 90% of all the time taken by the algorithm. Thus building
a special purpose chip or finding faster methods to reduce the time taken by field
multiplications will dramatically improve the total running time. Other possible im-
provements that they did not implement, were to use Pollard's lambda method for
catching kangaroos [57] instead of the baby-step giant-step method. Both has the
same expected running time but the later requires very little storage [46].
In 1991, Atkin described a new algorithm for computing #E(K) which uses
modular equations. The algorithm has not been rigorously analyzed but performs
remarkably well in practice. He also implemented another algorithm inspired by
Elkies' ideas, but it is only used for q odd, and generalization to the case q even does
not appear to be straightforward [46].
6.4Schoof's Algorithm
Schoof's algorithm is a deterministic algorithm to compute the number of points on
an elliptic curve. The versions presented below are constructed based on Schoof's
original paper [62]. An outline of the Schoof's algorithm is as follows:
By Hasse's Theorem (Theorem 3.2), the number of points on an elliptic curve
E over the field of q = 2k elements is of the form N= q + 1t, where Its < 2.14.
Schoof's Algorithm determines N modulo 1 for a bunch of small primes 1. If we run
through enough 1 so that 111 > 4A then N can be uniquely determined by the
Chinese Remainder Theorem (see Appendix C).34
For 1 > 2, one determines N modulo 1 by looking at the points of order 1, with
coordinates in field extensions of Fq. It turns out that N modulo 1 is determined by
the action of the map (x, y) 1-4 (xq, yq) on the set of points of order 1. For example,
suppose that the map (x, y) J-÷ (xq, yq) leaves some such point fixed. Then this
means that there is a point of order 1 whose coordinates are in Fq, i.e., our original
group of points with Fq coordinates has a nontrivial element of order 1. In that case
N E-_- 0 (mod 1).More generally, the value of N modulo 1 is determined by how
the q-th power map permutes the points of order 1. Thus, a basic role in Schoof's
algorithm is played by the so-called "division polynomials", which characterize the
point P (with coordinates in extensions of Fq) for which 1P is the identity.
Below is the Schoof's algorithm, preceded with the definitions used while de-
scribing it.
6.4.1Definitions
Let EIFq be the curve y2 = x3ax + b, where char(Fq)neq2, 3. The polynomials
1117,(x, y) E Fq[x, y] for n > 1 are defined as:
11_1(x,y) = 1
To(x, y) = 0
1111(x, y) = 1
T2(x,y) = 2y
1/3(x, y)= 3x4 + 6ax2 + 12bxa2
*4(x,= 4y(x6 +5ax4 + 20bx35a2x24abx8b2a3)
W2n(x, Y)= 11'n (Tn+21`2n-iIn-2Wn2+1)/2y (n > 1)
12n +1 (x, Y) = Wn+2W3n (n > 1)35
The division polynomials fn(x) E Fq[x] are defined as follows: First eliminate all
y2 terms from lifn using the ellipticcurve relation, and call it then define:
fn (x) =
(x, y)
lin(x,Y) /Y
if n is odd,
if n is even.
First version describes the algorithm using words and the latter is the more
detailed and formal version. Parallelization is also introduced during the detailed
description in the second version.
6.4.2Version 1
Input:Underlying field Fq, the list of primes up to O(V4),
polynomials fn for 1 < n < 4
Output: #E(FO, i.e., the number of points on the elliptic curve E(Fq)
1. Find the smallest L such that product of all primes up to L (except 2 and p)
is greater than 41/4 ; call this set of primes as S.
2. Calculate the functions fn for 5 < n < L
3. For each number 1 in the set S do the followings:
(a) vq (mod 1)
(b) If there is a non-zero point P in E[1] for which OP= ±vP holds
then
i.if 4P = vP holds
then t0 (mod 1)
else (i.e., if OP = vP holds)
A. find a squareroot w of q (mod 1)
B. if 0/P±wP
then t0 (mod 1)
else if 01P = wP36
then t2w (mod 1)
else (i.e., 01P = wP) t = 2w (mod 1)
else (i.e., if there is no point satisfying 4P = ±vP)
check for every T E {1, 2,... ,l} to see if there is a non-zero point P in
E[l] for which OPP +gP= 7-01 holds. Store the solution as tT (mod 1).
4. Compute the value of t using the values (t mod 1) for (1 E S) in the Chinese
Remainder Theorem (see Appendix C).
5. The number of points on the elliptic curve is equal to (q +1t).
6.4.3Version 2
Input:Underlying field Fq, the list of primes up to 0(\/4),
polynomials fn, for 1 < n < 4
Output: Integer #E(Fq) which is the number of points on the elliptic curve E(Fq)
1. Find the smallest L such that product of all primes up to L (except 2 and p)
is greater than 4/ ; call this set of primes as S.
2. For u from 1 up to logL do the followings in parallel: Calculate the function
.1'. for 4 + 2u-1 < n < 3 + 2u
3. In parallel for each number 1 in the set S, do the followings:
(a) vq (mod 1)
(b) if v is even then
GCD1 = gcd((e2x)g(x)(x3 + Ax + B) + fv_i(x)fv+i(x), fi(x))
else
GCD1gcd((e2x)fi (x) + fv-i (x)fv+i (x) (x3 + Ax +fi(x))
(c) if GCD1 0 1 then
i.if (I) = 1 then t FE 0 (mod 1)
else37
A. Find a square root w of q by checking in parallel for
all w E {1,2,...,1- 1} if w2 -q (mod 1)
B. if w is even then
GCD2 = gcd((xq-x)f,2,(x)(x3+Ax+B)+ f,_1(x)f±i(x), fi(x))
else
GCD2 = gcd((xq-x)420(x)+ fw_i(x) fw+i(x)(x3 + Ax +fi(x))
C. if GCD2 = 1 then t0 (mod 1)
else
I. if w is even then
GCD3 = gcd(4(x3 + Ax + B)(q-1)I2 fiv(x)420_2(x) fw_i(x)
+ g_2(x).f.+1(x), fi(x))
else
GCD3 = gcd(4(x3 + Ax + B)(q+3)12 43v(x)gv+2(x).f._1(x)
+ fiv-2(x)fw+1(x), ft(x))
II. if GCD3 = 1 then t-2w (mod 1)
else t2w (mod 1)
else find the values of T E {1, 2,. ,l} for which the polynomials POL1
and POL2 are zero(mod fi(x)). (can be done in parallel for every T E
{1, 2,.,l }) Store the solution as tT (mod 1).
i.a = Tv+24q-i41v-24141417q2+1 11q
ii.= ((xxq2)1F2,lif_14,+1)
iii. POL1 = (Tv- Tv+i (e2 + xq + x))/32 + xna2)
+ Vrq +1F?T-11141/62ing
iv. POL2 = 4q17q14q(a((2e2 + x)11q,111v-iqfv-1-1)"2/34q)
041,2)(11'7+214_11117-2n-F1)q
4. Compute the value of t using the values (t mod 1) for (1 E S) in the Chinese
Remainder Theorem (see Appendix C).
5. #E(Fq) = (q +1t).38
Note that for characteristic 2, the general form of the curve E I Fq is
y2 x3a2x2 +
where a2 E {0, w }, w E Fq being a fixed element of trace 1, and as E F. Then the
division polynomials given above simplifies as shown below:
f0 = 0
II= 1
12 = x
f3 = X4 + X3 + as
h = x6 ± a6x
2
f2n+1 = fn3fn+2 ± fn-1 fn3+1n > 2
X f2n = fn2infn+2 ± fn-2 Lifn+1n> 3
The algorithm will also be simplified ( see [28, 46] or [44]).
6.5 A Cryptographically Useful Subclass of Elliptic Curves
The following proposition gives the orders of some special elliptic curves:
Proposition 6.1 ([4]) The order of the group of the elliptic curve defined by y2 =
x3 + as over Fp withp "=-' 1 (mod 3) is p +1. The order of the group of the elliptic
curve defined by y2 + y = x3 + as over F2k,where k is odd, is 2k + 1.
In the implementation, the cryptographically useful curves are found, if the
number p* in the factorization of the group order
p+1 = 23.p* or 2k + 1 = 3- p*
is a large prime. In [4], it is shown that it is indeed possible to find curves with
this property. On these curves, finding an element with high order is achieved by
calculating the 6th and the 3rd order of some arbitrary element, respectively, and
then checking if the result is not the identity.If it is not, then the order of this
element is a multiple of p*.39
Table 6.1. Operations required by different methods
Method Adding two distinct pointsDoubling a point
Addition formulas I + 2M I + 3M
Projective coordinates 13M 7M
Notation:I=InversionM=Multiplication
6.6Improving Speed
Instead of applying the addition formulas directlyone can change the method, i.e.,
restore to projective coordinates to gain speed by avoiding the costly inversion oper-
ation. Table 6.1 summarizes the number of operations needed by different methods
[46].
6.7ElGamal Cryptosystem Using Elliptic Curves
Elliptic curves can be used to implement the ElGamal Cryptosystem [47].The
protocol is as follows:
1. (Setup) A non supersingular curve E of the form y2 + xy= x3 + a2x2 + as
defined over F2k is chosen. A point P (preferably a generator) on E is made
public. A normal basis is used to represent the elements of F2k.User B wants
to send the message (M1, M2) to user A.
2. A chooses an integer a and makes public aP, while keeping a itself secret.
3. B selects a random integer v and computes the points vP and avP=y),
using the public point P and A's public key aP.
4. Assuming that x, 90, B sends to A the point vP, and the field elements
M1 and M2y.40
5. To read the message, A multiplies the point vP by his secret key a to obtain
(x, y), from which he can recover M1 and M2 in two divisions.
A multiple of an elliptic curve point can be found using the repeated double-and-
add algorithm (see Appendix B.2). Morain [50] presents some addition-subtraction
chains for integers k which lead to faster algorithms than that method. Koyama and
Tsuruoka do the same for elliptic curves over the ring Zn, [46].
In this system four field elements are transmitted in order to convey a message
consisting of two field elements. Thus there is message expansion by a factor of 2.
This can be reduced to 3/2 by only sending x1 and a single bit ofy1 /x1 (if xi 0 0),
instead of sending the point P = (x1, yi). This is called point compression technic.
Details can be found in [46] and [23]. For a software implementation of the ElGamal
cryptosystem over the finite field F2104 see the paper [20].
In [8], R. Candall describes an implementation of the elliptic curve analogue
of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange.Crandall presents a method for performing
arithmetic modulo p using only shift and add operations, eliminating the need for
costly divisions. This technic, together with an inversionless parameterization of the
elliptic curve, results in a very efficient implementation of elliptic curve arithmetic.
The system is called Fast Elliptic Encryption (FEE).
6.8Implementations
Table 6.2 summarizes the results of some of the implementations [46].
For some other hardware designed to perform calculations in finite fields, see
[9, 12, 14, 71] and also consult the books [37, 42, 45, 24].41
Table 6.2. Speed comparison of some implementations (in clock cycles)
Year Implementer/Device Clock RatingInversionMultiplication
1988Newbridge Microsystems Inc.
& Cryptech Systems Inc.
20 MHz 50,000 1,300
1993 VLSI device 40 MHz 3,800 16542
Chapter 7
OTHER APPLICATIONS OF ELLIPTIC CURVES
7.1Primality Testing Using Elliptic Curves
The classical methods of primality testing are as follows [35]:
Trial Division: Divisibility of the given number is tested with primes up a certain
bound. Clearly the bound should be less than but it is infeasible if it is
very big.
Fermat's Little Theorem: Finding an integer a for which an 0 a (mod n) will
prove that the number n is composite. The number a is called a it witness.
However finding a witness might be difficult or even impossible. There exist
composite numbers, the so-called Carmichael numbers, for which there exist
no witnesses of n.
Probabilistic Compositeness Test: A witness of the compositeness of the num-
ber n is found if an integer a E {1, 2,... , n1} is found that fails to satisfy
a 1(mod n) or ar.2z = (mod n),
for some i with 0 < i < k, where n1 = r2k. If the generalized Riemann
hypothesis were known to be true, it would suffice to verify the above condition
for a in {2, 3,... ,r2(logn)21}, because the interval would contain a witness if
n were composite.
Pocklington's Theorem: Let s be a positive divisor of (n1) with s > 1).
Randomly select integers a, until one satisfies:
an---1 al: 1(mod n) and gcd(a(n-1)/q1,n) = 143
for each prime q dividings. Then every prime dividing n is congruent to 1
modulo s. If that doesn't work, then n is probably not a prime.
Downrun: Simultaneously factorn1 and n1. If the unfactored part of any of
them is found to be a probable prime, then apply the strategy recursively to
prove the primality of this newly found probable prime. In this way a chain of
primes n = no, n1,., ntis built, such that ni divides ni_1 + 1 or ni_1 1 and
such that the primality of ni implies the primality of ni_i.
11 Divisors: The algorithm based on the following theorem is not only polynomial
in time; but it is even efficient in practice.
Theorem 7.1 Let r, s and n be integers satisfying
0 < r < s < n, s >sn, gcd(r, s) = 1
Then there exist at most 11 positive divisors of n that are congruent tor modulo
s, and there is a polynomial algorithm for determining all these divisors.
A combination of this theorem with Pocklington's Theorem yields the following
primality test: First find an integer a satisfying both conditions in the previous
method. This shows that the prime divisors of n are all congruent to 1 modulo
s. Next apply the algorithm in the above theorem to find at most 11 positive
divisors of n that are congruent to 1 modulo s. If no nontrivial factor of n has
been found in this way, then n is prime.
Jacobi Sum Test: If, for positive integers n and s, certain Termat-like' tests hold
for n, s, and the prime divisors q of s, then any prime divisor of n is congruent
to a power of n modulo s. This test is similar to the previous method but here
s can be taken as it any product > N/T-c. The tests involving Gauss sums can
be replaced by tests involving Jacobi sums. The Jacobi sum test consists of
various `Fermat-like' tests.
The main problem with the classical primality tests is that they are tied to
groups that are fixed as soon as n is fixed. If those groups turn out not to have the44
favorable properties that are needed to complete the primality proof, then nothing
can be done about it, since changing the group would change n and consequently
change the problem.Elliptic curves provide the choice of groups such that their
relevant properties are randomized in the proper way, so that if the group chosen
does not have the right properties, then another group will be chosen [35].
For a randomly chosen elliptic curve over Fn, with n prime, the group order
#E(Fn) will behave as a random integernear (n + 1), by Hasse's Theorem (Theo-
rem 3.2). And the choice of the elliptic curve can be repeated until E(Fn) has the
favorable properties required. The following theorem can be formulated:
Theorem 7.2 ([35]) Let n > 1 be an integer with gcd(n, 6) = 1. Let E be an elliptic
curve over Z InZ, and let u and s be positive integers with s dividing u. Suppose
there is a point P on the curve satisfying:
u P = 0andu P 0
for each prime q dividing s. Then #E(Fp)0 (mod s) for every prime p dividing
n, and if s > (n114 + 1)2 then n is prime.
This theorem leads to the following primality test based on elliptic curves [35]:
Select an elliptic curve E over Z /nZ and an integer u such that
and
u = #E(Fn) if n is prime
u = v - q ,
for a small integer v > 1 and a probable prime q > (n114 + 1)2.
Given the pair (E, u), select a point P E E (2 I nZ) satisfying the requirements
of the above theorem, with s = q by performing the following steps:
1. Randomly select an x E ZInZ and find y such that the point P = (x, y) is on
the elliptic curve E(Z /nZ).45
2. Compute (ulq)- P =v P. If v P is undefined, then a nontrivial divisor ofn
has been found, which is exceedingly unlikely. If v P= 0, then go back to the
previous step; this happens with probability < 1/2 if n is prime. Otherwise if
v P # 0, verify that q(v P) = u P = 0, which must be the case if n is
prime, because then #E(Fn)= u.
3. Prove the primality of q recursively using this algorithm, unless the primality
of q can be proved directly using some other method.
Using an efficient method for choosing E and u as explained in [35], the expected
running time of the above test will be polynomial in log n.
7.2Factorization Based on Elliptic Curves
Lenstra's factorization method is based on the same idea as Pollard's (p 1) method
(for both algorithms see Appendix B.5). The order of the group of rational points
on the elliptic curve is used in a similar way as (p1). The two methods are almost
identical. The advantage of the elliptic curve is that there are a large number of
different curves that can be tried each with a potentially different order.In the
Pollard's method, we don't have the choice of changing p [67, 59].
The following theorem is due to Lenstra:
Theorem 7.3 ([67]) The elliptic curve method with v = L:p,1, 1/2]1/V splits any
integer n in expected time 0(L[p,1, 1/2]+°(1)(logn)2) where p is the smallest prime
divisor of n.
Corollary 7.4 ([67]) The elliptic curve method can be used to factor completely any
n in expected time 0(L[n,1,112]1+0(1)).
The above results show that asymptotically, Lenstra's method is as good as any
previously known method to factor n. It has ,however, in addition several advantages.
It is easy to program and ideally suited to implementation in parallel; many elliptic
curves can be tried simultaneously and independently. It requires very little storage46
and can be conveniently run asa background job. And if n has a small prime factor,
this can be expected to be found sooner than larger ones and helps to terminate the
method in a shorter time. The running time of the previous methodswas independent
of the size of the factors [67].47
Chapter 8
FINITE FIELDS
8.1Choosing a Field
To efficiently implement the Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems, it is important to select a
curve and a field so that the number of field operations involved in adding two points
is minimized. Curves over the field K = F2k are preferred because of the following
reasons [46]:
The arithmetic in F2k is easier to implement in computer hardware than the
arithmetic in finite fields of characteristic greater than 2, because of its binary
nature.
When using a normal basis representation for the elements of F2k, squaring a
field element becomes a simple shift of the vector representation, and thus the
multiplication count in adding two points is reduced.
With curves over F2k, it is easy to use the point compression technic (see
Section 6.7), i.e., to recover the y-coordinate of a point given its x-coordinate
plus a bit of extra information. This is useful in reducing message expansion
in the ElGamal cryptosystem as will be explained later in this chapter.
For these reasons and because the supersingular curves do not offer an advantage
over finite field based cryptosystems, only the non- supersingular curves over F2k will
be considered in the rest of this thesis.
8.2Representation of Finite Field Elements
For short notes on finite fields, please refer to Appendix D. The elements of the
field GF(2k) can be represented in several different ways [42, 45, 38]. The polyno-48
mial representation seems to be useful and suitable for both hardware and software
implementations. According to this representation an elementa of GF(2/9is a poly-
nomial of length k, that is of degree less than or equal to (k1), written as
k-1
a(x) = Eaixi,
i.0
where the coefficientsai E GF(2),i.e.,ai E {0,1}.
As a shorthand to the polynomial representation, the elementacan be repre-
sented as the k-dimensional vector
a = (ak_iak-2aiao)
Software implementations are often based on the word-level representations of the
field elements. So, assume that k satisfies the inequality
sw > k > (s1)w,
where w is the word-size which depends on the implementation details and the com-
puter.In this case, partitioning the k-dimensional vector into w-bit blocks, the
word-level representation ofa(x)becomes
(As_1243_2AiAo)
whereAiis of length w for i = 0,1, ,(s1). These Ai blocks are also represented
as polynomials of degree (w1) using the notationAi(x).In hardware, a field
element is stored in a shift register of length k.
In general, the field F2k can be viewed as a vector space of dimension k overF2.
Then, there exists a set of k elements ao, ai, ,ak_iin F2k such that each a E F2k
can be written uniquely in vector space representation as
k-1
a = E aiai
i=0
a can also be represented as the 01 vector
aiE {0,1} .
(ak-i, 7ai, ao)49
A normal basis of F2k over F2 is a basis of the form
where )3 E F2k; it is well known that such a basis always exists [37]. Any element
a E F2k can be represented as
k-1
a = E ai E 10,11.
Unless otherwise noted, the first, i.e., the polynomial representation will be used.
In order to simplify the analysis, we will assume k = sw.
8.3Arithmetic in Finite Fields
An irreducible polynomial n(x) of order k is needed to construct the finite field F2k,
which is also called the Galois Field GF(2k).
The addition of two elements a and b in GF(2k) is performed by adding the
polynomials a(x) and b(x), where the coefficients are added in GF(2). This is equiv-
alent to the bit-wise XOR operation on the vectors a and b. The word-level addition is
simply the bit-wise XOR operation on a pair of 1 -word, i.e., 2 w-bit binary numbers,
which is a readily available instruction on most general purpose microprocessors and
signal processors. Assuming the processor can perform this word level XOR operation
in one cycle, the computation of c := a + b requires s cycles. While analyzing the
circuit delays in hardware implementations, however, TA and Tx will be used to
represent the delays of single 2-input AND and XOR gates, respectively.
During the multiplication of two elements a and b in GF(2k), reduction by the
irreducible polynomial n(x) is often required. The product c = ab E GF(2k) is
obtained by computing
c(x) = a(x)b(x)(mod n(x)),
where c(x) is a polynomial of length k, representing the element c E GF(2k). Thus,
the multiplication operation in the field GF(2k) is accomplished by first multiplying50
the input polynomials, and then performing a modular reduction using the generating
polynomial n(x).
The word-level multiplication operation receives two 1-word (w-bit) polynomials
A(x) and B(x) defined over GF(2), and computes the 2-word polynomial
C(x) = A(x)B(x).
The degree of the product polynomial C(x) is 2(w1). For example, given A =
(1101) and B = (1010), this operation computes C as
A(x)B(x) = (X3 + X2 + 1) (X3 + )= X6 +x5+ X4 + X = (0111 0010).
The implementation of this operation, which we call MULGF2 as in [30], can be per-
formed in three different ways:
1. An instruction implemented on the processor
2. The table lookup method
3. The emulation using the XOR and SHIFT operations
The details of the analysis of these methods can be found in [30]. The fastest is the
first one, while the slowest is the last one. In our analysis, we will simply count the
number of MULGF2 operations, and assume that they are implemented using any of
the above methods. A simple method for implementing the table lookup approach
is to use two tables, one for computing the higher (H) and the other for computing
the lower (L) bits of the product. The tables are addressed using the bits of the
operands, and thus, the total size of these tables is of size 2 x 2w x 2w x w bits. We
store the values H and L in two table reads. Other approaches are also possible.
Since squaring is a linear operator in F2k,when using the normal basis represen-
tation, square of a becomes
k-1 k-1
a2= E E aia;
i.0 j=0
k-1
E ai 02i + 2EaiajO
i=j=0 k-1>i>j>051
k-1
2 n2j+1 ai p
i=0
k-1
Eaifi2i+1
i=0
k-1
Eai_ /fi
i=o
= (ak_2,, ao,ak_i),
with indices reduced modulo m. Hence a normal basis representation is advantageous
because squaring a field element can be accomplished by a simple rotation of the
vector representation, an operation that is easily implemented in hardware; thus
squaring an element also takes one clock cycle.
Multiplication in a normal basis representation is more complicated. Let
A =-- (ak_i,, a1,ao)and B = (bk-1,-,b1, b0)
be arbitrary elements in F2k,and let
= A B = 7 CiCO)
Then
k-1 k-1 k-1 k-1 klk-1
= E EaibiA1°)/= E Eaibi4= E Eai+ibj+iej,
i=0 .J=0 i=0 J.0 i =0 j=0
where E {0, 1} and is defined by
They can be proven to satisfy
4)j
k 1
022= E4,32'
1=0
for all0 <j, / < k1.
Hence if a logic circuit with inputs A and B is built to compute the product
digit co, then the same circuit with inputs A2-1 and B2-1, which are simply the cyclic
shifts of the vector representation of A and B, yields the product digit c1.In this
way C can be computed in k clock cycles. Massey and Omura [53] constructed a
serial-in serial-out multiplier to exploit this particular aspect of normal bases [46].52
The complexity of such a circuit is determined by CN, the number of non-zero
terms .147°.), since this quantity measures the number of interconnections between the
registers containing A, B and the product C. Clearly, CN < k2. A lower bound
on CN is CN > 2k1 [51].If CN = 2k1, then the normal basis is said to be
optimal. Optimal normal bases were introduced and studied by Mullin, Onyszchuk,
Vanstone and Wilson. The constructions together with a list of fields for which these
bases exist, can be found in [51]. Gao and Lenstra proved in [13] that the optimal
normal bases constructed in [51], are essentially all of the optimal normal bases. An
associated architecture for a hardware implementation is given in [1].Using this
architecture a multiplication can be performed in k clock cycles.
Finally, the most efficient technic, from the point of view of minimizing the
number of multiplications, to compute an inverse of an element in F2k was proposed
by Itoh, Teechai and Tsujii [68]. Observe that if a E F2k, a0, then
If k is odd, then
yields
-2k-2-1\) 2 a-1= a=a2".
2k-11(2(k-1)/21)(2(k-1)/21)
= a
Hence it takes only one additional multiplication to evaluate a2k-1-1 once the quan-
tity a2(")/2-1 is known (ignoring the cost of squaring which is a shift operation). If
k is even, then
a2k-1-1=2(2(k-1)(2-1)(2(k-1)/2+1)+i
and consequently it takes two additional multiplications to evaluate a2k-'-1 once
the quantity a2(k-1)/2-1 is known. The procedure is then repeated recursively. This
method requires exactly
Llog2(k1)] + w(k1)1
field multiplications, where w(n) denotes the Hamming weight of 71, i.e., the number
of l's in the binary representation of n [46].53
Chapter 9
A REDUCTION METHOD FOR MULTIPLICATION
In this chapter, a new table lookup based reduction method for performing the modu-
lar reduction operation is proposed. This methodcan be used to obtain fast software
implementations of the finite field multiplication and squaring operations. The re-
duction algorithm has both left-to-right and right-to-left versions, which respectively
improve the standard and Montgomery multiplication methods. Furthermore, it is
shown that the right-to-left version of the proposed reduction method also works in
the integer case, if the modulus n is an odd number.
9.1Introduction
The software implementation of the arithmetic operations in GF(2k) require that we
design word-level algorithms for efficient implementation on current general purpose
microprocessors. We propose a new table lookup based reduction (TLBR) method
for performing the modular reduction operation, which can be used to obtain fast
software implementations of the finite field multiplication and squaring operations.
The proposed modular reduction method has three important properties:
The method works for an arbitrary generating polynomial n(x).It does not
assume any special structure in n(x), for example, the generating polynomial
need not be a trinomial, a sparse polynomial, or an all-one-polynomial (AOP).
However, in such cases, the method simplifies to certain modular reduction
methods existing in the literature.
The method provides word-level algorithms, enabling efficient software imple-
mentations of finite field multiplication and squaring operations.54
The method has both left-to-right and right-to-left versions, which are useful
for performing both the standard and the Montgomery multiplications in finite
fields.
Furthermore, it turns out that the right-to-left version of the TLBR method is also
applicable to the integer case, giving a more efficient Montgomery multiplication
algorithm. The left-to-right version, however, turns out to be inefficient in the integer
case.
9.2Table Lookup Based Reduction Algorithms
The proposed modular reduction methodology is a table lookup based method, which
uses a table of the multiples of the generating polynomial n(x), and performs a word-
level division. We start with n(x), which is a polynomial of degree k, and compute all
multiples of n(x) having degrees less than k + w. Consider the set of all polynomials
over GF(2) of length w and the set of all w-bit integers as
Qw = {1,x, x + 1, X2, X2 ± 1, X2 ± X,.Xtv-1ev-2 ± 1},
.rw = 1}.
Let q; (x) be the ith element of Qw and
vi(x) = qi(x)n(x)
for i E I. The polynomial vi(x) is of degree less than k + w, which we represent as
an (s + 1) -word number
vi(x) = ViIVi,o)
We then construct the table T1 containing 2' rows, in which we store the polynomial
vi(x) using its most significant word (w-bits) as the index, i.e.,
(Vis) = (Vio-1Vi,iVi,o)
for i E 1w. An important observation is that the most significant words Vio for i E 1-w
span the set Q, in other words, they are all unique.Theorem 9.1 The most significant words V,8 are all unique for i E
Proof Assume Vio = Vio for ij. The polynomial
p(x) = vi (x) + vi (x)
has degree less than k, the degree of p(x), since
p(x) = +
= (0133_1PiP0)
Furthermore, p(x) is divisible byn(x)since
p(x) =qi(x)n(x) + qi(x)n(x) =(qi(x) +qj(x))n(x) ,
which means p(x) can only be the zero polynomial, i.e., i = j.
55
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The table T1 will be used in the left-to-right TLBR algorithm for reducing polyno-
mials modulo n(x), i.e., to compute
p(x) (modn(x)) .
In order to perform the Montgomery-type reduction, we use a right-to-left TLBR
algorithm and obtain
x-kp(x) (modn(x)) .
This algorithm requires that we construct a table of multiples ofn(x)based on the
least significant words. Similarly, we take the polynomial
vi(x) =qi(x)n(x)
for i E 1,, and construct the table T2 containing 2" rows. The table T2 keeps the
polynomial vi (x), where we use the least significant word Vi,0 as the index, i.e.,
T2 (Vi,O) = (Vio142121)
The uniqueness of the least significant words 14,0 depends on whether n(x) is not
divisible by x.56
Theorem 9.2 The least significant words Voare all unique for i E 1if and only
if n(x) is not divisible by x.
Proof Assume Vo = Vi,0 for ij. The polynomial
p(x) = (vi (x) + vi (x))
has degree less than k, the degree of p(x), since
p(x) = x-w ((Vi,sVi,s-iVoVi,o) + (Vi,slij,s-1.Vjo.Vi,o))
= x-w(P,P2P10)
(PsP2P1)
Furthermore, p(x) is divisible by n(x) if and only if
gcd(xw, n(x)) =1
since
p(x) = x-"(qi(x)n(x) + qj(x)n(x))= x'(qi(x) + qi(x))n(x).
Therefore, p(x) can only be the zero polynomial, i.e., i= j. The condition
gcd(xw, n(x)) =1
is satisfied if and only if n(x) is not divisible byx. 0
The tables T1 and T2 are used to reduce a polynomial of length (sw + w) to
a polynomial of length sw using the irreducible polynomial n(x).Let p(x) be a
polynomial of length (sw + w), which is to be reduced, denotedas
p(x) = (PsPs_iPiPo)
The left-to-right TLBR algorithm computes
p(x) (mod n(x)),
while the right-to-left TLBR algorithm computes
x-"p(x) (mod n(x)).
The resulting polynomial in both cases is of length sw.Left-To-Right TLBR Algorithm: To reduce
select the entry
p(x) = PIA)
(Vs IVs -2ViVo)
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from the table T1 using the index Ps= Vs. Since T1 was constructed so that
the element
(P078-117,2VIVO
resides in position P,, we have
p(x):=(PsPs_iPiPo) + (PsysIVs-2
:=(0.F1_1PIPiD
where Pi = P3 + Vi for j = 0,1,... , s1. We also discard the most significant
w bits of the new p(x). Since we add a multiple of n(x) to p(x), and obtain a
polynomial of length sw, we effectively compute
p(x) (mod n(x)),
as required. We denote the above computation as
p(x) := p(x) +71(Ps)
Right-To-Left TLBR Algorithm: To reduce
select the entry
p(x) = (PsPsi-PiPo)
(vsv.,-1V1)
from the table T2 using the index Po= Vo. Since T2 was constructed so that
the element
(vsysiviP0)58
resides in position P0, we have
P(x):=(P5Ps-1-liP0) + -1413o)
:= pi 0),
where Pi =+17; for j = 1, 2,... , s.We then shift the new p(x), w bits to
the right, i.e., we multiply it by x-z". Since we add a multiple of n(x) to p(x),
and then, multiply it by x' in order to obtain a polynomial of length sw, we
effectively compute
x-wp(x) (mod n(x)),
as required. We will denote the above computation as
p(x) := x-w (p(x) + T2(130))
9.3Standard Multiplication Using TLBR Method
The standard multiplication algorithm computes
c(x) = a(x)b(x) (mod n(x))
given a(x), b(x), and n(x). In order to apply the TLBR method, we first construct
the table T1 using the generating polynomial n(x). The algorithm then proceeds by
multiplying one word of a(x) by the entire b(x), which is followed by a table lookup
reduction to reduce the partial product. We will call this algorithm STDMUL, whose
steps are given below:
Algorithm STDMUL
Step 0:Construct T1 using n(x) and w
Step 1.c(x) := 0
Step 2.for i = s1 downto 0 do
Step 3. c(x)xwc(x) + Ai (x)b(x)
Step 4. c(x)c(x) +(Cs)
Step 5.return c(x)59
The operation in Step 4 ofSTDMULis performed by first discarding the sth (the
most significant) word of
c(x) = (CsCs_iC1C0)
and then by adding the s-word number
Ti(Cs) =
to the partial product c(x) as
Vi Vo)
Cs-1Ci-2 C1CO
Vs-1Vs-2 V1VO
Similarly, we perform the standard squaring operation using the TLBR method. This
algorithm is denoted asSTDSQU,whose steps are given below. An important saving
in this case is that the cross product terms disappear because the ground field is
GF(2). Since
k -1
a
2(X) = E aix
2i= ak_ix2(k-1)ak_2X2(k-2) + aix2 + a0
i=0
(9.2)
the multiplication step (i.e., Step 3) inSTDMULcan be skipped. The standard
squaring algorithm, calledSTDSQU,starts with the degree 2(k1) polynomial
c(x) = a2(x) given by
c(x) = (ak_1Oak_200(404),
and then performs the reduction steps using the table T1.
Algorithm STDSQU
Step 0:Construct T1 using n(x) and w
Step 1.c(x) := Etfc; aix2i
Step 2.for i = 2s 1 downto s do
Step 3. c(x) := c(x) + Tl (Ci)
Step 4.return c(x)60
We perform the operation in Step 3 of STDSQU by first discarding the ith (the most
significant) word of
c(x) = (CiCi_iCiCo)
and then by adding the s-word number
Ti(Ci)= (Vs-iVs-2-ViVo)
to the partial product c(x) by aligning 17,1 with Ci_i from the left:
Ci_iCfi-2 Ci-s+1Ci-s C1 CO
Vs-1Vs-2 V1 VO
Thus, each addition operation in Step 3 requires exactlys XOR operations.
9.4Example : Standard Multiplication Using TLBR
We take the field GF(28) to illustrate the construction of the table T1, and also give
an example of the standard multiplication operation using the TLBR method. We
select the irreducible polynomial as
n(x) = x8 + x5 + x3 + x2 +1. (9.3)
We also select w = 4, which gives s = k/w= 8/4 = 2. The table T1 is constructed
by taking a polynomial q(x) from Q4, multiplying it by n(x) to obtain
v(x) = q(x)n(x),
and then placing the least significant s = 2 words of v (x) to T1 using the most signif-
icant word as the index. The step-by-step construction of T1 is shown in Table 9.1.
The multiples of n(x) do not necessarily come in an increasing order, however, we
have a complete set of most significant words, and thus,we can use these values as
their indices to store them in T1. The table T1 is shown in Table 9.1 in its unsorted
form. When sorted with respect to the most significant words, i.e. the i values, we
no longer need the first column.Table 9.1. The construction of T1 and T2 for n(x)= (0001 0010 1101).
q (x) v(x)
(0000)(000000000000)
(0001)(000100101101)
(0010)(001001011010)
(0011)(001101110111)
(0100)(010010110100)
(0101)(010110011001)
(0110)(011011101110)
(0111)(011111000011)
(1000)(100101101000)
(1001)(100001000101)
(1010)(101100110010)
(1011)(101000011111)
(1100)(110111011100)
(1101)(110011110001)
(1110)(111110000110)
(1111)(111010101011)
i 71(i)
(0000)(00000000)
(0001)(00101101)
(0010)(01011010)
(0011)(01110111)
(0100)(10110100)
(0101)(10011001)
(0110)(11101110)
(0111)(11000011)
(1001)(01101000)
(1000)(01000101)
(1011)(00110010)
(1010)(00011111)
(1101)(11011100)
(1100)(11110001)
(1110)(10101011)
(1111)(10000110)
i 7;(0
(0000)(00000000)
(1101)(00010010)
(1010)(00100101)
(0111)(00110111)
(0100)(01001011)
(1001)(01011001)
(1110)(01101110)
(0011)(01111100)
(1000)(10010110)
(0101)(10000100)
(0010)(10110011)
(1111)(10100001)
(1100)(11011101)
(0001)(11001111)
(0110)(11111000)
(1011)(11101010)
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Furthermore, we also give the table T2 in Table 9.1, which is to be used by
the right-to-left TLBR algorithm for computing the Montgomery multiplication and
squaring operations in GF(28). The table T2 is constructed by placing the polynomial
v(x) in T2 using its least significant word as the index. Again the table T2 shown in
Table 9.1 is in its unsorted form and we will get rid of the first column that includes
the least significant words, i.e., the i values, as soon as the rows of the table is sorted
using them.As an example forSTDMUL,we take
a(x) x7 + x6 + x4 + x3 + x +1= (1101 1011) = (A1.A.0)
b(x) x7 +x6+x3±x2+x (1010 1110) = (131-130)
The algorithm starts with c(x) = 0 and then performs the following steps to find the
result:
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(9.4)
i = 1Step 3:c(x) c(x)x4 +Al (x)b(x) =(C2C1Co)
0+ (1101)(1010 1110) = (0111 0110 0110)
Step 4:c(x):=c(x) + T1(C2) = (C1 Co) + T1(C2)
(0110 0110) + (1100 0011) = (1010 0101)
i = 0Step 3:c(x):=c(x)x4 +Ao(x)b(x) =(C2C1C0)
(1010 0101 0000) + (1011) (1010 1110)
(1110 1101 0010)
Step 4:c(x):=c(x) + T1(C2)= (C1C0) +T1(C2)
(1010 1011) + (1101 0010) = (0111 1001)
Therefore, the result is found as
C(X) = 1001) = X6 ± X5 ± X4 4- x3 + 1.
9.5Montgomery Multiplication Using TLBR Method
The Montgomery product of two elementsa(x)andb(x)is defined as the computation
of
c(x) = a(x)b(x)r-1(x) (modn(x)) ,
wherer(x)is a fixed element of the field [30]. It is established that when
r(x) =xk (modn(x)) ,
we can obtain efficient software implementations of the Montgomery multiplication
operation in GF(2k). Thus in the sequel, we define the Montgomery multiplication
of a(x) and b(x) as
x-ka(x)b(x)(modn(x)) .63
Note that the inverse element
x-k(xk)-1
exists since n(x) is an irreducible polynomial, and thus
gcd(xk, n(x))= 1.
The details of the Montgomery multiplication algorithm in GF(2k) and its properties
are found in [30]. The algorithm requires that we compute N6(x) in advance which
is the least significant word of the polynomial n'(x) defined as
n'(x) = n(x)-1 (mod xk).
An algorithm for computing NN(x) is also described in [30]. However, it turns out
that the Montgomery multiplication method using the TLBR algorithm does not
require the computation of N(x). This is not surprising since the table T2 keeps all
2' multiples of n(x), and therefore, there is no need to separately compute N6(x).
The steps of the Montgomery multiplication algorithm using the TLBR method
are given below. The algorithm, which we call MONMUL, is based on the right-to-left
TLBR algorithm described in Section 9.2.
Algorithm MONMUL
Step 0:Construct 7'2 using n(x) and w
Step 1.c(x) := 0
Step 2.for i = 0 to s1 do
Step 3. c(x) := c(x) + Ai(x)b(x)
Step 4. c(x) := x-w(c(x) + T2(Co))
Step 5.return c(x)
At the end of Step 1, we have an (s + 1) -word number
C = (cscs_ci co)-
We discard the 0th (the least significant) word Co, and then add the s-word number
T2(co)= (v-sys_iv2v1)64
to the partial product c(x) by aligning V1 with C1 from the right:
CsCs-1 C2 C1
VsVs -1 V2V1
Thus, the 1-word shift operation denoted as the multiplication by x-w is implicitly
performed. Each addition operation in Step 4 requires exactlys XOR operations.
Similarly, the Montgomery squaring method computes
c(x) = x-k a2(x) (mod n(x)).
In order to compute c(x), we first obtain a2(x) using the property (9.2), and then
reduce the result with the help of the right-to-left TLBR algorithm,as seen below.
Algorithm MONSQU
Step 0:Construct T2 using n(x) and w
Step 1.c(x) aix2i
Step 2.for i = 0 to s1 do
Step 3. c(x) := x-w (c(x) ± T2 (Co))
Step 4.return c(x)
When Step 1 completes, we have an (2s1) -word number
C = (C2,2C2s-3C1 Co)
In the beginning of the ith step, the number c(x) is an (2si1) -word number
C = (C2s-i-2C2s-i-3CiCo)
We perform the operation in Step 3 of MONSQU by first discarding the 0th (the
least significant) word of c(x), and then by adding the s-word number
T2 (Co)(VsVs-1 V1)
to the partial product c(x) by aligning V1 with C1 from right, as follows:
CSC5-1 C2 C1
VsVs -1 V2V165
As in the case for the Montgomery multiplication, the 1-word shift operation, i.e.,
the multiplication by x', is implicitly performed, and each addition operation in
Step 3 requires exactly s XOR operations.
9.6Example : Montgomery Multiplication Using TLBR
We take the field GF(28) and the same irreducible polynomial n(x)as the one exem-
plified in Section 9.4. The lookup table T2 is exactly thesame as the one in Table 9.1.
In this case, however, we compute the Montgomery product of thesame polynomials
a(x) and b(x) given in Equation (9.4).
Therefore, we will be computing
c(x) = a(x)b(x)(mod n(x)).
The right-to-left TLBR algorithm starts with
a(x) =(A1240) = (1101 1011)
b(x) = (BIB()) = (1010 1110)
c(x) = 0
and performs the following steps:
i = 0Step 3:c(x):=c(x) +Ao(x)b(x) =(C2C1C0)
= 0 + (1011) (1010 1110) =-- (0100 1000 0010)
Step 4:c(x):=x-4 (c(x) + T2(Co))= (C2C1) + T2(Co)
=(0100 1000) + (1011 0011) = (1111 1011)
i = 1Step 3:c(x):=c(x) +Ai(x)b(x) =(C2C1C0)
= (1111 1011) + (1101)(1010 1110) = (0111 1001 1101)
Step 4:c(x):=(x-4c(x) + T2(C0))= (C2C1) + T2(Co)
= (0111 1001) + (0001 0010) = (0110 1011)
The product is found as
C(X)(0110 1011) = X6 + X6 + X3 + X + 1.66
Table 9.2. The size of the table in bytes for theTABLEREADoperation.
kw=4w =8w =10w=16
160 3205,12020,4801,310,720
256 5128,19232,7682,097,152
5121,02416,38465,5364,194,304
10242,04832,768131,0728,388,608
9.7Analyses of the Algorithms
In this section, we analyze the standard and Montgomery multiplication algorithms
by calculating the size of the lookup tables and counting the total number of the
table read and the word-level GF(2) addition and multiplication operations. The
implementation details of the word-level operationswere studied in Section 8.3 be-
fore. We will denote the table read operation usingTABLEREAD,and count the total
number ofTABLEREADoperations. In regards to the sizes of these tables, we note
that the table T1 (or T2) has 2w rows, each of which contains a polynomial of length
k. This implies that the size of the tables is 2w x k bits. The space requirements
for the tables Ti (or T2) for performing theTABLEREADoperation are exemplified in
Table 9.2.
For example, if w = 8 and k = 160, the size of the table is 28 x 20= 5, 120 bytes,
which is quite reasonable. However, the table size becomes excessive as we increase
the word-size. For a fixed field size k, we can decide about the word-size w given the
memory capacity of the computer system.
Now, we give the steps of the algorithms STDMUL and MONMUL in detail in
Table 9.3, together with the number ofTABLEREAD, MULGF2,andXORoperations.
The total number of operations for STDMUL, STDSQU, MONMUL, MONSQU
are summarized in Table 9.4. Furthermore, in Table 9.5, we give the coefficients of
the highest term s2 in the operation counts of the multiplication algorithms using the67
Table 9.3. Operation counts for STDMUL and MONMUL algorithms.
STDMUL TABLEREADMULGF2XOR
for i=0 to s do
C D.] : =0 -
for i=s-1 downto 0 do
P :=0
for j=s-1 downto 0 do
(H,L) :=MULGF2 (A [i],B[j] ) s2
C [j +1] : =C [j]XOR H XOR P 2s2
P :=L
C [0] :=P
for j=0 to s-1 do
C [j] :=C [j] XOR T [CCs]] [j] s s2
MONMUL TABLEREADMULGF2XOR
for i=0 to s do
CM := 0 - -
for i=0 to s-1 do
P := 0
forj=0to s-1 do
(H,L) :=MULGF2 (A [i.] ,H[j] ) s
2
C [i] : =-C [j] XOR L XOR P - 2s2
P := H
C [s]: =P
for j=0 to s-1 do
C[j]:= C[j +i] XOR T CCM] [j] s s
268
Table 9.4. The operation counts for the algorithms.
TABLEREADMULGF2XORSHIFT
STDMUL s 523 2 -
STDSQU s s2
MONMUL s s2 3s2
MONSQU s s2
Table 9.5. The operation count orders for the algorithms.
Using this method MULGF2XOR SHIFT
STDMUL 1 3 0
STDSQU 0 1 0
MONMUL 1 3 0
MONSQU 0 1 0
Using the method in [30]MULGF2XOR SHIFT
STDMUL 1# + 32(w + 1)
STDSQU 0 9- i -4 74 3w
MONMUL 2 4 0
MONSQU 1 2 069
proposed TLBR method, comparing them to those algorithms which do not utilize
the TLBR method. The detailed timing requirements of the algorithms without the
TLBR method are given in [30].
9.8Special Cases
The presented TLBR methods and the resulting multiplication algorithms work for
an arbitrary generating polynomial. The tables T1 (or T2) are constructed and used
without assuming a special structure in n(x). This is an important property of the
TLBR method, making it applicable for any value of k and for arbitrary generating
polynomials. However, it may be possible to avoid the construction of the tableor to
reduce the size of it or to reduce the time taken by the algorithm when the generating
polynomial has a special structure. In this section we consider several different forms
of irreducible polynomials for generating the field GF(2').
We start with the case in which the generating polynomial n(x) is of the form
n(x) = xk ++ aix + ao,
where j = tw and t < s is an integer. This implies that Xk is the only nonzero
term among the (st)w most significant terms of n(x), and thus, there is no need
to prepare the whole table T1 as the multiples of n(x) will have all zeros in the
most significant st words, except the most significant word which is used as an
index.It suffices to store the least significant t words of the multiples of n(x) to
reduce the partial product. Therefore, the size of the table T1 will be 2w x t xw
instead of 2w x s x w, i.e., the table size reduces linearly depending on the value of
t. Furthermore, we only add the t least significant words of the operands during the
addition operation since we know the remaining st words are zero. Therefore, Step
4 of STDMUL is performed by first discarding the sth (the most significant) word of
c(x) = (C,Cs-iCI. Co)
and then by adding the t-word number
Ti (Cs)=(14-04-2ViVo)70
to the partial product as
Cs1Cs _2 Ct Ct-1 Cl CO
V_1 V1VO
The most significant (st) words are not added since (Vs_117,_2Vt) is known to
be all zero. This operation requires t word-level XOR operations in the reduction step
(Step 4) instead of s.
9.8.1Trinomials
When the irreducible polynomial is a trinomial of the form
n(x) =+ xi +1 ,
where 1 < j < k, then, it turns out that there is no need toprepare the table
T1 (or T2) and thus we will drop the phrase TLB from the names of the reduction
algorithms. We can use the most significant (or the least significant) word of the
partial product in order to reduce it. There are different approaches, depending on
the value of j. If j is an integer multiple of the word size w, i.e., j= tw, we can use
the word-level shifts of the partial product. If j is not an integer multiple ofw, i.e.,
j = tw + u for some 1 < u < w, then, certain bit-level operations will need to be
performed.
For j = tw, the left-to-right reduction algorithm reduces the (s+ 1) -word partial
product
c(x) = (CsCs-iCiCo)
by adding C, multiple of the irreducible polynomial n(x) to it as
c(x) := c(x) + (x5w + xtui + 1)C3.
This implies that we need to add C, to Cs, Ct, and Co in Step 4 of the algorithm
STDM UL. However, we do not perform the first addition C, + C,= 0, as follows:
Ct + 1Ct ClCO
CS Cs71
Thus, during the ith step of the reduction, we perform 2 XOR operations. The mul-
tiplication algorithms described in [64, 72] are essentially the same.
The right-to-left reduction algorithm, on the other hand, uses Co to reduce the
partial product from the right (the least significant).Effectively, it performs the
operation
c(x) := c(x) + (xsw + xtw + 1)C0
in order to reduce the partial product 1-word from the right. This implies thatwe
add Co to Co, Ct, and Cs as follows:
CsCs-1 Ct+1Ct C1
Co Co
Similarly, we do not perform the addition of the least significant words Co + Co= 0,
and obtain the s-word partial product using only 2 XOR operations.
If j is not a multiple of w, but, say j= tw + u for a positive integer 1 < u < w,
we need to perform the operation
c(x) := c(x) + (x"' + xt"±u +1)C3
to reduce the most significant word of Cs of c(x). This implies that Cs is added to
Cs and CO, which takes care of the part c(x)+(xsw+1)Cs. In order to add xt"(xuCs)
to the partial product, Cs needs to be shifted u bits to left, which produces a 2-word
number (V1V0). Let
Cs = (Ck+w-1 Ck+1Ck)
then, (VI Vo) is obtained as
(V1) (V0) = (00 ck+w-1ck+w-2.ck+w-u) (ck-i-w_u_1ck+ick 0- 0).
We then add V1 and V2 to Ct+1 and Ct, respectively. The operations required to
reduce c(x) using the left-to-right reduction algorithm are shown below:
Cs_i Ct+iCt CI.Co
V1 Vo CS72
Similarly, the addition of the most significant words Cs + Cs= 0 is ignored.In
summary, the reduction operation during the ith step requires a few bit operations
to obtain V1 and V0, and then 3 word-level XOR operations.
On the other hand, the right-to-left reduction algorithm performs the operation
c(x) := c(x) + (x tw+u + 1)C0
in order to reduce the least significant word of Co of c(x). This implies thatwe add
Co to Cs and Co, taking care of the part c(x) + (xsw +1)Co. In order to perform the
operation
c(x) := c(x)xtw (xuco)
we shift Co to the left u times, obtaining a 2-word number (VIII) as before. We then
add 171 and 17(; to Ct+1 and Ct, respectively. The final reduction operation is
Cs Ct-1-1Ct C2 C1
CO 1711 VOI
The addition of the least significant words Co + Co= 0 is ignored. The right-to-left
reduction algorithm requires a few bit operations to compute V1 and n, followed by
3 word-level XOR operations.
9.8.2All-One-Polynomials
In this case, the generating polynomial n(x) will be an all-one-polynomial (AOP),
i.e., of the form
xk n(x) xk-1++ x + 1.
It is known that an AOP is irreducible if and only if k +1 is prime and 2 is primitive
modulo k +1 [45]. For k < 100, the AOP is irreducible for the following values of k:
2, 4, 10, 12, 18, 28, 36, 52, 58, 60, 66, 82, and 100.
The reduction is often performed using the polynomial (x + 1)n(x)xk+1 + 1,
thus as in the trinomial case we do not need the tables and we will drop the phrase
TLB from the names of the reduction algorithms.Since k + 1 is not an integer73
multiple of w, the exact word-level shifting is not possible with this polynomial. In
this case, we need to perform the operation on the (s +1)-word partial product c(x)
c(x) := c(x) + (xsw+1 + 1)A
where A is a 1-word number obtained from C,,as we will explain shortly. Since the
most significant word of the new c(x) needs to be zero, we obtain
Cs + (Ax) = 0,
and therefore, Ax = C,.If the least significant bit of C,, denoted as ck, is equal
to zero, the computation of A is very simple: A = C,/x, i.e., C, is shifted 1 bit to
the right to obtain A. Thus, A is actually an (w1)-bit number, and when Ax is
added to C5, the result is zero. The final reduction is performed using onlyone XOR
operation as
Cs-1Cs-2 C1 CO
A
However, when ck is not equal to zero, we have no other choice except to add the
entire n(x) to c(x). This implies that we add the w-bit AOP
2'1 = (111) = 1,
to each word of c(x) starting from 0 ending at s 1, as
Cs-1C5-2 C1 CO
1,1, 1,, 1
This operation makes the least significant bit ck zero. Therefore, ifck is nonzero, we
need to perform an additional s XOR operations to reduce the (s + 1)-word partial
product c(x).
On the other hand, the right-to-left reduction algorithm performs
c(x) := c(x) + (x'+1 + 1)Co
in order to reduce the least significant word Co of c(x). When Cc, is added to
c(x), the new least significant word Co will be zero.However, we also need to74
add xsw+1C0 to c(x). If the most significant bitcw_i of Co is zero, this operation is
easily accomplished. We compute Ao= Cox, and since c,,,_1 is zero, Ao fits into w
bits, i.e., 1-word. The following operation accomplishes the reduction:
CsCs_i Ci
Ao
If cu,_i is not zero, then Ao is no longer a 1-word number: it isa (w + 1)-bit number
containing a one its wth position:
Ao = (lcw-icw--2coo)
The reduced partial product in this case becomes
c(x)=(1 CsCs_iGC].)
As in the case for the left-to-right reduction algorithm,we have no other choice
except to add the entire AOP n(x) in order to reduce the most significant bit:
Cs Cs 1 C2 C1
w w 1wlw
Therefore, when we need to perform an additional s XOR, operations to reduce
the (s + 1) -word partial product c(x).
9.9Integer Case
In this section we consider the extension of the TLBR method to the integers. Weare
interested in reducing the (s + 1) -word integer a modulon, where n is an arbitrary
integer of length s words. In the following, we show that the right-to-left TLBR
algorithm works if and only if n is odd. On the other hand, the left-to-right TLBR
algorithm works for
21c±w n>
(2w + 1)
but it is inefficient.75
First we concentrate on the right-to-left TLBR algorithm. Let i E /u, andvi = in.
Since n is an s-word number and
0 < i < 2' 1,
the number vi for all i is an (s + 1) -word number, represented as
vi = (Vi,sVi,s-iVoVi,o)
The table T2 is constructed by the right-to-left TLBR algorithm using the least
significant words Vi,oas
T1(-14,0) = )
We note the minus sign in the index, which helps us to add the table entry to the
partial product, instead of subtracting it.
An important requirement is that all V,3 be unique for i E Iw. This way we
construct the complete table of the multiples of n to be added to the partial product.
The uniqueness of the least significant words depends on whether n is odd, which is
easily proven as follows.
Theorem 9.3 The least significant words of vi= in are unique for i E I,, if and
only if n is odd.
Proof The least significant word of vi is given as in (mod 2w). The set of residues
in (mod 2w) for i E 1-w is complete if and only if
gcd(n, 21") = 1.
This is satisfied when n is odd.
Therefore, the right-to-left TLBR algorithm used in the Montgomery multiplica-
tion and squaring algorithms works in the integer case for an odd n only. This gives
us a table lookup based Montgomery multiplication algorithm, which is more efficient
than the regular Montgomery multiplication since the reduction step is significantly
simplified. Furthermore, there is no need to compute no =76
Table 9.6. Multiples of n = 35 = (100 011).
i vi = in
001000100011
010001000110
011001101001
100010001100
101010101111
110011010010
111011110101
Unfortunately, the left-to-right TLBR algorithm does not workas well.It is
impractical for two main reasons:
1. The most significant words are not always unique,
2. Even when they are unique, the left-to-right TLBR algorithm cannotuse ad-
dition in place of subtraction since this will cause a carry to higher order bits.
As an example, we take w= 3 and n = 35 = (100 011), and produce the values
vi = in as shown in Table 9.6.
An inspection of Table 9.6 shows that the most significant wordsare not unique
for n = 35, for example, 001, 010, and 011appear twice, while 100, 101, 110, and
111 do not appear. We prove below that collisions occur if n < 2k+w/(2w + 1).
Theorem 9.4 If
2k±w n <
(2w + 1)
then there is always a collision, i.e., thereare at least two equal most significant
words. Otherwise, the most significant words are unique.
Proof We consider all multiples with s words. Let I be the integer such that
In < 2k±w < (I ± 1)n,77
i.e., In is the greatest multiple ofn, that has (8+1) words. Note that the difference
of any two consecutive multiples isn, which is less than 2k, and thus, the difference
of the most significant words of the consecutive multiplescan be at most one. In
particular, In has 2w1 = 11 as the most significant word. Thus, the most
significant words form a monotone increasingsequence. As the largest one is 1 1,
all possible single words existamong them.Therefore, we have I > 2". When
I = 2", we have uniqueness and when I > 2wwe have collision(s).
For
2k+" n <
(2w + 1)
using the definition of I, we have
(2k+w) 2k+w < (1. + 1)n< (i + 1)(2w + 1),
which yields 2w < I, i.e., we always havea collision. For
2k+w
n
(2w + 1)
again by the definition of I, we have
2k+w 2k±w > I n >
(2w + 1)/
which yields 2w + 1 > I, i.e., we haveno collision.
During the reduction, we need to make sure that the numberwe subtract is
less than the partial product. Thiscan be done by comparison, and if the selected
multiple is larger, we can use the previous multiple ofn instead.If the most sig-
nificant words of vis are not unique, i.e., if thereare collisions, then we have the
problem of choosing the correct multiple. Wecan solve this problem by assigning
the smallest multiple for all of the of the indices at which the collisionoccurs, which
will reduce the probability of a negative result. For example, for the most significant
word 001, we can assign the smaller multiple which is 001 000 110.Similarly, we
can use 010 001 100 and 011 010 010, for the most significant words 010 and 011,
respectively.However, in order to reduce the products with the most significant78
words not in our list, we will have to either assign the largest multiple 011 110 101
to all of them or continue to producemore multiples until we get all possible most
significant words. Note that,even after using this method, we still have to compare
the numbers and use the previous multiple ifnecessary. In short, when there is a
collision, the proposed table lookup based approach is not practical.79
Chapter 10
PARALLEL FINITE FIELD MULTIPLICATION
USING POLYNOMIAL RESIDUE NUMBER SYSTEMS
10.1Introduction
In this chapter a novel method of parallelization of the multiplication operation in
GF(2k) is presented for an arbitrary value of k and arbitrary irreducible polynomial
n(x) generating the field. The parallel algorithm is based on the Polynomial Residue
Number System. The parallel algorithm receives the residue representations of the
input operands (elements of the field) and produces the result in its residue form,
however, it is guaranteed that the degree of this polynomial is less than k, i.e., it is an
element of the field, properly reduced by the irreducible polynomial n(x). By proper
selection of the modulus polynomials, and the application of the Chinese Remainder
Theorem, yields an efficient parallel algorithm.
10.2Polynomial Residue Number Systems
Let
mi (x),m2 (x),...,mL (x)
be a list of pairwise relatively prime polynomials such that the degree of mi(x) is
equal to di for i = 1, 2,... ,L. We choose m,i(x) such that each di is approximately
equal to 2k /L, and thus, the product polynomial
L
M(x) = fl mi(x)
is of degree d > 2k. A polynomial p(x) is represented in the Polynomial Residue
Number Systems (PRNS) with a list of remainders:
p= (Ply P27,PL)80
where
pi (x) = p(x)(mod mi (x) )
for i = 1, 2,... ,L.For efficiency reasons, we select each mi (x) so that pi(x) is
represented using at most w bits or 1 word. This implies that deepi(x))= di <
w. Furthermore, the polynomials mi (x) need to be pairwise relatively prime, i.e.,
gcd(mi, mi) = 1 for ij. Therefore, we construct the PRNS by finding L pairwise
relatively prime polynomials mi(x), each of which is of degree w, such that the degree
of M(x) is Lw > 2k. Since k= sw, we have L > 2s. The reason for choosing the
PRNS range as twice the size of the inputs is that we need to represent the product
of two operands (or the square of one operand) uniquely.
Once the PRNS is constructed by proper selection of the L such polynomials,
we can perform the PRNS arithmetic. The residue addition and multiplication op-
erations in the PRNS are defined as follows:
:= + b represents the residue addition:
:= ai + bi(mod mi)
e :=*-1; represents the residue multiplication:
ci:= aibi(mod mi)
i =1,2,...,n
i =1,2,...,n.
If an operand is not a vector but a single polynomial, e.g., a, (which is of length w),
then we will assume that it is a vector with all entries equal to a as (a, a,... ,a). For
ti
example, 6= a * I; implies that
(c1,c2,...,CL) = (a, a,... ,a) * bz, ,bL)
or in other words,
ci = abi(mod mi).
The conversion from the PRNS representation to the polynomial representation
is based on the extension of the Chinese Remainder Theorem (see Appendix C) to
the polynomials [25]. Given the PRNS representation of p(x) as
15= ,PL)81
we use the Single Radix Conversion (SRC) algorithm to compute p(x) using
p(x) =
where
i =1
(Mil mod mi) MiImod M(x),
(x) =
M(x)
= mi(x)m2(x)mi_i(x)mi+i(x)mL(x),
mi (x)
and, the inverse Mil (mod mi) is defined as
Mil Mi =1 (mod mi),
which exists since gcd(Mi, mi) = 1 and all mis are pairwise relatively prime. We will
assume that the coefficients mi for i = 1, 2,... ,L, and the inverse vector
I=(mi--1- mod ml,/VWmod m2,-ME1mod mL)
are precomputed and used in the SRC algorithm. Here the polynomials
Mi (x) = M(x)/mi (x)
are of degree (L 1)w . The entries offare reduced, i.e., the degree of WI- (mod mi)
is less than the degree of mi. Using these definitions, we give the SRC algorithm
which computes the polynomial p(x) given its residue representation 7:7 as follows:
THE SRC ALGORITHM
Input: 15 = (P1, P2,/4)
Output: p(x) (mod M) (x)
Auxiliary:M,, M2, , andf
Step 1. r :=75*
Step 2. p(x) := ri mimod M(x)
Step 3. return p(x)
10.3Finite Field Multiplication Using the PRNS
If
s(x) = a(x) + b(x),82
then the degree of s(x) is not larger than the maximum of the degrees of a(x) and
b(x), thus, the PRNS arithmetic would yield the exact result, i.e.,
ti
..-s= c1+6
However, in multiplication
p(x) = a(x)b(x),
the degree of the resulting polynomial increases.The polynomial p(x) needs to
be reduced modulo the irreducible polynomial n(x) in order to obtain the product
c = a b in GF(2k). Therefore, if we want to use the PRNS for multiplication modulo
n(x), we need to devise a method to reduce the resulting polynomial modulo n(x).
We will perform this reduction using the table lookup reduction algorithm proposed
in [19].This algorithm precomputes the multiples of the irreducible polynomial
n(x), and stores them in the table T in sucha way that a word-level reduction
becomes possible using these stored values. We start with n(x), which is a degree-k
polynomial, and compute all multiples of n(x), which has at most k + w bits (ors + 1
words). Consider the set of all polynomialsover GF(2) of length w and the set of
all w-bit integers:
Qw = {1, X, X + 1, X2, X2 + 1, X2 +X, ... Xw-1 + Xw-2 ++ 1},
1= {0,1,2,...,2w .
Let qi (x) be the ith element of qv and
vi(x) = qi(x)n(x)
for i E 1w. The polynomial vi(x) is of degree less than (k + w), which we represent
as an (s + 1)-word number
vi(x) = vovi,o)
We then construct the table T containing 2'n rows, in which we store the polynomial
vi(x) using its most significant word (w-bits)as the index, i.e.,
T[vi,s] = ,83
for i EAn important observation is that the most significant words Vi,3 for iE 1,0
span the set Q, in other words, they are all unique [19]. We use the left-to-right
reduction algorithm. In order to reduce
P(x) = (Ps PsiPi Po),
we select the entry
(Vs-iVs-2-VIVO
from the table T using the index P,= V,.Since T was constructed so that the
element
(Ps Vs-1Vs-2 VIVO)
resides in position P,, we have
p(x):= p(x) +T[Ps]
= (PsP.5-1PiPo) + (PsVs-1Vs-2- -VIVO
= (OP:_l-PiPo)
where P' = Pj+Vj for j= 0,1, ... , s1. We also discard the most significant w bits
of the new p(x). Since we add a multiple of n(x) to p(x), and obtaina polynomial
of length sw, we effectively compute p(x) (mod n(x)),as required.
Furthermore, we compute the multiples of n(x) in the PRNS representation
and store them similarly in the table T, which has 2"rows and L independent
columns, where each column containsa 1-word number at each row. If the PRNS
representation of
(vsys_i vivo)
is given as
= (Vi7 V2, VL) 7
then the row V, of the table f holds vi in column i for i= 1, 2, ... , L, i.e.,
t[Vs](vi, v2,,vL)
The tables T and f are used to reduce a polynomial modulo the irreducible polyno-
mial n(x). The PRNS-based multiplication algorithm is given below.84
THE PRNSBASED MULTIPLICATION ALGORITHM
Input: and -1;
Output: and c(x)
Auxiliary: M1 ML, I, T, and
Step 1. ei*g
Step 2. e*
Step 3. c(x) :=ri Mi mod M(x)
Step 4. for i = 2s1 downto s
Step 5. c := 5+ -24[Cd *x(i-s)w
Step 6. c(x) := c(x) + T[Ci]x(i-s)w
Step 7. return c and c(x)
Assuming the input polynomials a(x) and b(x)are of degree at most k1, we
have the product polynomial c(x) in its residue representation at the end of Step 1,
however, this polynomial is of degree 2(k1). The representation is still unique,
since the degree of M(x) is at least 2k, and thus, the SRC algorithm will yield a
unique result. However, we cannotuse the resulting polynomial c(x) and its residue
representation Sas an input to another multiplication. We need touse the generating
polynomial n(x) to reduce e and c(x)so that the result is again less than n(x). Steps
3-6 accomplish this reduction. First we use the SRC algorithm to compute c(z), and
then in Steps 5 and 6, we use the left-to-right reduction algorithm to reduce c(x)
so that it is of degree at most k1. We perform the operation in Step 6 by first
discarding the ith (the most significant) word of
c(x) = (CiCi_iCiCo)
and then by adding the s-word number
T[Ci]= (Vs-1Vs -2VIVO
to the partial product c(x) by aligning Vs_1 with Ci_i from the left:
Ci 1 - 2 Cis + 1ci- s1 C1 CO
CiVs 4 Vs 2 V1 VO85
The addition of the most significant words Ci + Ci= 0 is not performed. Also the
terms Ci_s_1 down to Co are not involved in the addition either. Only the terms
starting from V3_1 down to Vo are added to the corresponding terms of c(x) in order
to reduce c(x) modulo n(x). Thus, the shift factor x(i-s)w is taken care of by this
alignment process.
Furthermore, as we reduce c(x) modulo n(x) in Step 6, we also reduce its residue
representation e using n and T in Step 5 by multiplying the residue numbers f[Ci]
and
(5(i-s)w, 5(i-s)w,, ,
x(i
-s)w)
and then adding the result to 6.
10.4Example : PRNS-based Multiplication
We will illustrate the PRNS-based multiplication algorithm using the same example
as in Section 9.4, i.e. we will compute
c(x) = a(x)b(x)(mod n(x)),
using the same polynomials a(x), b(x) and n(x) as before:
n(x) = x8 + x5 + x3 ++ 1 = (1 0010 1101)
a(x) =+ x8+ x4 + x3+ x + 1 =(1101 1011) = (Apelo)
b(x) = x7+x5+x3+x2+x =(1010 1110) = (BiBo)
The lookup table T of multiples of n(x) is exactly the same as T1 in Table 9.1. The
sorted form is shown in Table 10.1.
The precomputation of the multiples will be extended to include the PRNS
representations. Since k = 8 for we select w = 4, and thus, s = 2. Furthermore,
L = 2s = 4, which implies that we need 4 pairwise relatively prime polynomials
mi(x), each of which is of degree 4, to construct the PRNS. We select the following
polynomials as moduli:
(x) = x4 + x + 186
Table 10.1. The lookup tables T and I' for n(x) = (1 0010 1101).
index T T
(0000)(00000000)(0000,0000,0000,0000)
(0001)(00101101)(1110,1000,1000,0100)
(0010)(01011010)(1111,1001,1101,1000)
(0011)(01110111)(0001,0001,0101,1100)
(0100)(10110100)(1101,1011,0111,1111)
(0101)(10011001)(0011,0011,1111,1011)
(0110)(11101110)(0010,0010,1010,0111)
(0111)(11000011)(1100,1010,0010,0011)
(1000)(01000101)(0111,0111,0110,0101)
(1001)(01101000)(1001,1111,1110,0001)
(1010)(00011111)(1000,1110,1011,1101)
(1011)(00110010)(0110, ono,0011,1001)
(1100)(11110001)(1010,1100,0001,1010)
(1101)(11011100)(0100,0100,1001,1110)
(1110)(10101011)(0101,0101,1100,0010)
(1111)(10000110)(1011,1101,0100,0110)87
M2(X) = X4 + X3 + 1
M3 (X) = x4 + x3 + x2 + 1
M4 (X) = X4 + X3 + X2 + X + 1
This gives us
M(x) = ml(x)m2(x)m3(x)m4(x)
x16+x15x14+x13
x11+x10 +x8x7 +x5 +x4+x2
The following values are also easily computed:
M1
M2
M3
M4
x12x11x10+x7 +x +1
x12 +x10 +x8 +x3 +x2 +1
x12 +x9 +x6 +x3+1
x12x8x5x4x3x2
(x3 + x2 + X, X3, X3, x2)
=
(x+1,x3x +1,2 + x +1,x3 +x2)
We then compute the multiples of 71 and store them in table T. The lookup table f,
is also added to Table 10.1, with the entries in thesame row representing the same
multiple.
We now illustrate the steps of the PRNS-based finite field multiplication algo-
rithm that computes the product c(x). The PRNS representations ofa and b are
found as
= (1111,1010,1001,0010)
6= (0011,0010,1000,1011)
The PRNS-based multiplication algorithm starts withc = 0 and performs the fol-
lowing steps to find the result
c(x)
as follows:
= X6 + X6 + X4 + X3 + 1 = (0111 1001)88
Step 1:6=6* g= (1111, 1010, 1001, 0010) *(0011,0010,1000,1011)
=(0010, 1101,0110,1001)
Step 2: 7?=6* 1= (0010,1101,0110,1001)*(0011,1011, 0111, 1100)
=
Step 3: c(x) =
(0110, 0010,1111,1111)
1 ri Mi mod M(x)
=(0110)(0001110010000011)+
(0010)(0001010100001101)+
(1111)- (0001001001001001)+
(1111)(0001000100111111)
=(01110010 1110 0010) = (C3C2C1C0)
(i = 3) Step 5:e = 6+ ti[C3] * x4= 6+/4[0111] * x4
= ( 0010,1101, 0110, 1001) + (1100,1010, 0010, 0011) * x4
= (0101,0001,0001,0111)
Step 6: c(x) = c(x) + T[C3] x4= (0010 1110 0010) + T[0111] x4
= (1110 1101 0010) = (C2C1C0)
2) Step 5:6 = 6+ f[c2] * x°= 6 +
= (0101, 0001, 0001, 0111) + (0101, 0101,1100, 0010)
= (0000, 0100,1101, 0101)
Step 6: c(x) = c(x) + T[C2] x°= (1101 0010) + T[1110]
= (1101 0010) + (1010 1011) = (0111 1001) = (CiCo)
The last vector c in Step 5 or the last polynomial c(x) in Step 6 yields the result.
The result 5 in Step 5 is reduced modulo n(s), and thus, it can be used as an input
to another multiplication.
(i =
10.5Improving the PRNS-based Multiplication Algorithm
In this section, we give an improved PRNS-based multiplication algorithm, which
saves computational time and space as compared to the multiplication algorithm
given in Section 10.3 and exemplified in Section 10.4. The improved algorithm is
based on the following observations:89
We compute the polynomial representation of c(x) along with its residue rep-
resentation e only because we need the words of c(x) to reduce c modulo n(x).
We only use the most significant s words of c(x) starting from (2s1) down
to s to perform this reduction, as seen in Step 4.
Therefore, the SRC algorithm for computing c(x) can be modified so that we only
compute the most significant s words of c(x), and thus, save space and time in the
PRNS-based multiplication algorithm.
In Step 3 of the PRNS-based multiplication algorithm, we first compute
L
c(x) = ETi A
i=i
and then perform a modulo M(x) reduction. Since L= 2s, and each one of A is of
length (at most) (2s1) words, the above computation can be written as
L
c(x) = ETi(Mi,2s-2Mi,28-3Mi,iMi,o)
i=1
Since we are only interested in computing the most significant s words of c(x), the
above sum must be divided by x3". To avoid unnecessary computation, we first
divide Mi by x(3-1*, then perform the multiplications and the summation, and
finally divide the result by xw. This way we first discard the part of Mi which does
not contribute to the final result, and then, we perform another division to get only
the necessary part of c(x). More explicitly, we truncate Mi by ignoring the words
indexed from 0 up to (s2), and only keep the ones from (s1) up to (2s2).
This implies that we compute
L
ETi (Mi,23-2Mi,28-3Mi,sMi,s-1000).
j=1
The least significant (s1) words of zeros can be ignored by computing
L
ETi (Mi,2s-2Mi,2.9-3Mi,sMi,s-1)
i=1
The multiplication operation
Ti(Mi,2s-2Mi,2s-3
Ti
Mi
x(s-1)w
i=190
produces an (s + 1)-word number; the addition of L such numbers is still of length
(s + 1) words. Since we only need the most significants words, we ignore the least
significant word of the result as
L
C (x) = E rZ
x(8-1)w)xw i=1
= C1C0).
This result is less than M(x) and it is not reduced modulo M(x). Furthermore, the
values
Mi(x)
Mi'(x) =x(s--1)w
can be precomputed. The most significant s words of c(x) is computed using the
modified SRC algorithm as follows:
THE MODIFIED SRC ALGORITHM
Input: i5= (1)1,P2,-,pi,)
Output: p'(x): The most significant s words of p(x)
Auxiliary:MI, /14, ,MI, and
Step 1. := f)*I 5-"
Step 2. p'(x) := (EL ri./u1) x-
Step 3. return p'(x)
The modified PRNS-based multiplication algorithm uses the modified SRC algorithm
given above to compute c'(x) in order to reduce 6.
THE MODIFIED PRNS-BASED MULTIPLICATION ALGORITHM
ti
Input: d and
Output:
Auxiliary:MI, it/4, ,Mi, I, T, and f4
Step 1. := Et' *-1;
ti
Step 2. r := 6*
Step 3. c'(x) := (EL riMZ) x-
Step 4. for i = s1 downto 0
Step 5. c := 6+ 77"[Cn * xi"Step 6.
Step 7.
c'(x) := ( c'(x) mod xit" ) + T[q] x-(s-i)to
return
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We have only the most significant s words of c(x). The entire c(x) can be written
as
c(x) C:9,;Cs_1Cs-2 CICo)
In order to reduce c(x) in step for i= s1, we need to take the most significant
word C's_1 and obtain the table entry
and add it to c(x) as
Cs-1
T[CS-1](Vs-1Vs-2 VIVO) 7
q_2 Cs-1Cs-2 CI.CO
VS-1 V2V1VO
In general, in the ith step, we need to take the least significant i words of c'(x)
and add (si) words right-shifted version of T[q] to c'(x) in Step 6.Similarly,
we perform the reduction onin Step 5. The most significant words of c(x) are
completely zeroed during the reduction process in Step 6. We do not provide c(x)'
as an output, and the modified PRNS-based multiplication algorithm returnsonly.
10.6Example : Improved PRNS-based Algorithm
We illustrate the steps of the modified PRNS-based multiplication algorithm using
the same example as the one in Section 10.4. The precomputation part and the
tables remain the same. Additionally, we need to compute M1(x) for i = 1, 2,... ,L,
which are obtained using
as
A
x(8-1)w = Mi/x4
(0001 1100 1000 0011)/x4 = (0001 1100 1000),
= 0101 0000 1101)/x4 = (0001 0101 0000),=
Af.'4 =
The algorithm takes the same Ei and b.as input operands, and performs the following
steps to find the result
(0001
(0001
0010
0001
0100 l001vx4 =
0011 1111)/x4 =
(0001
(0001
0010
0001
0100),
0011).
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5= (0000,0100,1101, 0101).
Step 1:c=g= (1111,1010,1001,0010) *(0011,0010,1000,1011)
=(0010, 1101, 0110, 1001)
Step 2: f.*=5 * I = (0010,1101, 0110,1001) *(0011, 1011, 0111,1100)
= (0110, 0010, 1111, 1111)
Step 3: c'(x) = itil)x-4
= [(ono)(0001 1100 1000) + (0010)(0001 0101 0000)+
(1111)(0001 0010 0100)+
(1111)(0001 0001 0011)] x-4
= (0111 0010)
(i = 1) Step 5:c = 5+ T[Cl] * x4 = 5+ f[0111] * x4
(0010, 1101, 0110, 1001) + (1100, 1010,0010, 0011) * x4
= (0101,0001,0001,0111)
Step 6: c'(x) = ( c'(x) mod x4 ) + Trn x-4= (0010) + T[0111] x-4
(0010) + (1100) = (1110)
(i = 0) Step 5:c = 5+ f[C0] * x° = 5+ f[1110]
(0101, 0001, 0001, 0111) + (0101, 0101, 1100, 0010)
= (0000, 0100,1101, 0101)
Step 6: c(x)' = ( c'(x) mod x° ) + T[q] x°
= (1110) + T[1110] = (0000)
Since c'(x) after Step 6 for i= 0 is not needed, this computation may be skipped.
10.7Analysis of the PRNS-based Multiplication Algorithm
In this section, we analyze the PRNS-based multiplication algorithm by counting the
total number of word-level GF(2) addition and multiplication operations. The word-93
Table 10.2. Operation counts for the PRNS-based multiplication algorithm.
Steps MULGF2 XOR
Step 1 1
Step2 1
Step 3 s s 1+ s loge(2s)
Step 5 (s times) 1 1
Step 6 (s times) 1
Total 2s +23s1 +s log2(2s)
level multiplication operationMULGF2is performed using the table lookup method,
and the word-level addition operation is performed using the bit-wise XOR which is
available on most processors. The implementation details of these operations were
studied in Section 8.3 before.
Following the assumption made in Section10.2,we select deg(mi) = w, and
perform modulo mi(x) multiplications using the table lookup method.
Since there are L different moduli, we assume that we haveL = 2sprocessors
each of which performs its arithmetic (addition and multiplication) operations with
respect to its selected modulus. We also use a processor which we call the 'server'
to perform a few table lookup operations. The server can be one of the processors.
We ignore the server operations and the communication overhead in our analysis.
The analysis of the improved PRNS-based multiplication algorithm is given be-
low. The results are summarized in Table 10.2.
Step 1: This step requires a singleMULGF2operation by each of2sprocessors.
Step 2: This step requires a singleMULGF2operation by each of2sprocessors.
Step 3: Let
M'= (K.9_011,8_2- )94
This value is already precomputed and saved. During Step 3, the ithprocessor
multiplies ri by M' usingMULGF2operation and obtains the (s+1)-word result.
Each word multiplication for j= 0, 1, ,(s1) produces a 2-word result
ri (HiLj).
These parts must then be added to obtain the final resultri.A4-; as follows:
A/gs_2 m',2m1,1m1,0
Ti
L3_1Ls2 L2L1Lo
H5_1 H3-2Hs _3 H1Ho
SsSs-1Ss-2 S2 S1 SO
The above operation is performed using sMULGF2operations and (s1) XOR
operations by the ith processor for all processors i = 1, 2,... ,2s.
Then the 0th word is discarded and the remaining s-word polynomials are
summed by all 2s processors using the binary tree algorithm. This operation
takes log2(2s) steps, where at each step two s-word polynomials are added.
Therefore, s log2 (2s) XOR operations are required.
The resulting s-word polynomial c' (x) is communicated to the server and to
the first s processors among all 2s processors. This polynomial is needed in
Step 6.
Step 5: To speed up this step, the values
xiw(mod mi)
are precomputed and stored for all i = 1, 2,... ,(s1) and j = 1, 2,... ,2s.
The server performs a lookup operation for xi' (mod m1) and also for[CI],
and sends them to the jth processor for all j= 1, 2, ... , 2s. Each processor
then performs a singleMULGF2operation and a single XOR operation to obtain
6:= e+ i[q]
for a single vector entry.95
Step 6: In this step, we add the i-word shifted polynomial T[q] to c'(x). Since c'(x)
is available in the first s processors, each of one of these processors performs a
single XOR operation. The updated polynomial c'(x) is then communicated to
the server.
10.8Applications of the PRNS-based Multiplication
The improved algorithm takes two polynomials in their residue representation 01 and b
such that the degree of each of a(x) and b(x) are less than k, and produces the product
polynomial in its residue representation 6. The squaring algorithm can be given using
the similar construction method, however, there may be certain optimizations.
The PRNS-based multiplication algorithm for the field GF(2k) finds its applica-
tions in cryptography where the range of the operands are large, usually
160 < k < 1024,
therefore, it is justifiable to use parallel polynomial arithmetic. We give an exponen-
tiation algorithm for computing ge where g E CF(2k) and e is an r-bit integer
below.
e = (er-ier-2eieo)
THE PRNS-BASED EXPONENTIATION ALGORITHM
Input: g(x), e, and n(x)
Output: c(x) = ge
Auxiliary:MI, ,Mi, I, T, and
Step 1. Compute § and e:= (1,1,,1)
Step 2. for i = r1 downto 0
Step 3. e:= Multiply(e,
Step 4. if ei = 1 then e := Multiply(§,
Step 5. c(x) := SRC(ci
Step 6. return c(x)96
Here the multiplication algorithm is the modified PRNS-based multiplication
method given in Section 10.5, which uses the modified SRC algorithm within. Since
we need the entire c(x) as the output of the exponentiation operation, the original
SRC algorithm is used in Step 6.97
Chapter 11
A GENERAL MASTROVITO MULTIPLIER
In this chapter, we propose a new formulation of the multiplication matrix and an
architecture for the multiplication operation in finite fields of characteristic 2. The
proposed architecture generalizes the Mastrovito multiplication. Since 2Th' is generally
used to represent the finite field associated with the Mastrovito multiplier, different
than the rest of the thesis, we will use the variable m instead of k, to denote the
dimension of the finite field in this chapter. The proposed method is particularly
efficient when applied to a specific class of polynomials that is known in advance, as
it uses all possible optimizations. We have also studied all known special cases in
detail, and obtained space and time complexities, and furthermore, provided actual
design examples.
11.1Introduction
The efficiency of the architecture is measured by the number of 2-input gates (XOR
and AND) and by the total gate delay of the circuit. The representation of the field
elements have crucial role in the efficiency of the architecture. For example, the well-
known Massey-Omura [53] algorithm uses the normal basis representation, where the
squaring of a field element is equivalent to a cyclic shift in its binary representation
(see Chapter 8). Efficient bit-parallel algorithms for the multiplication operation in
the canonical basis representation, which have much less space and time complexity
than the Massey-Omura multiplier, have also been proposed.
The standard (polynomial) basis multiplication requires a polynomial modular
multiplication followed by a modular reduction. In practice, these two steps can be
combined. A novel method of multiplication is proposed by Mastrovito in [39, 40], in98
which a matrix product representation of the multiplication operation is used. The
Mastrovito multiplier using the special generating trinomial
is shown to require (m21) XOR gates and m2 AND gates [39, 40, 54, 55]. It has been
conjectured that the space complexity of the Mastrovito multiplier would also be the
same for all trinomials of the form
xm + xn + 1
for n = 1, 2,... , m1. This conjecture was shown to be not true for the case of
m = 2n in [31]. The architecture proposed by Koc and Sunar in [31] requires (m2-1)
XOR gates and m2 AND gates, when m 0 2n. However, the required number of XOR
gates is reduced to (m2'fl) for the trinomial
XM +XI' +1,
for an even 7n.
In this chapter, we generalize the approach of [31] in several ways. We describe
a method of construction for the Mastrovito multiplier for a general irreducible poly-
nomial. We give detailed space and time analysis of the proposed method for several
different types of irreducible polynomials. It turns out that our method also requires
(m2 XOR and m2 AND gates for the trinomial of the form
xmx +1 ,
for an even in.
The best special case of the proposed method is in the case of equally-spaced-
polynomial (ESP), i.e., a polynomial of the form
p(x)xizAx(k-1)A
The best-known architecture for this case requires (m21) XOR gates [21], whereas
our method uses only (m2.A) XOR gates. The ESPs reduce to the special trinomials
xmx +199
for k = 2 and reduce to the all-one-polynomials (AOPs)
xmxm-1 + -I- x2x + 1,
for A = 1. Thus, our proposed general architecture requires (m21) XOR gates and
m2 AND gates when the irreducible polynomial isan AOP. An architecture for the
canonical basis multiplication operation in GF(2m) was proposed by Koc and Sunar
in [32] for an irreducible AOP, which uses (m2 -1) XOR gates and m2 AND gates, while
requiring significantly less space and time complexity than similar bit-parallel finite
field multiplication architectures [39, 69, 21]. Therefore, our proposed architecture
also captures this established lower bound on the number of XOR gates for multipliers
based on irreducible AOPs.
11.2Notation & Preliminaries
Let p(x) be the irreducible polynomial generating the Galois field GF(2m). In order
to compute the multiplication
c(x) = a(x)b(x)(mod p)(x)
in GF(2m), where a(x), b(x), c(x) E GF(2m), we need to first compute the product
polynomial
d(x) = a(x)b(x) =(E aixi) CEbix)
i=o i=o
and then reduce d(x) using p(x) to find the result c(x) E GF(2m). We can compute
the coefficients of d(x) using following matrix-vector product:100
do
d1
d2
dm -2
ao
al
a2
am_2
0
ao
ai
am_3
0
0
ao
am-4
0
0
0
ao
0
0
0
0
bo
bi
b2
dm_i am-1am-2am-3 al ao
dm 0am-1am-2 a2a
bm_2
dm+1 0 0am-1 a3 a2
bm_i
d2m_3 0 0 0 am_iam_2
d2m-2 0 0 0 0am-
The above multiplication matrix will be called M, and itsrows will be denoted by
Mi where i = 0, 1, ,2m-2. Note that the entries of M solely consist of coefficients
of a(x). The m x m submatrix UM of M will be defined as the firstm rows of M,
and the (m1) x m submatrix LM of M will be definedas the last (m1) rows
of M, i.e.,
=
al
0 0 00
ao 0 00
a2al ao 00
am-2 am_3 am -4 a00
am_2 am_3 ala0
0am_iam_2 a2al
0 0am_i a3 a2
=
00 0 am_iam_2
00 0 am,- 1101
Superscripts will be used to denote the step numbers during the reduction process
and the superscript (f) will be used to indicate the final form of the corresponding
matrix. When referring to a matrix in general, no superscript will be used.
All the rows in the submatrix LO) of matrix M will be reduced, using the
irreducible polynomial p(x), so that, at the end of reduction, L(f) will become the
zero matrix. During that process, the rows of L will be added to the rows with lower
indices according to the irreducible polynomial. All therow vectors, that are added
to the others due to the reduction of a single row, will be called its children. The
final submatrix U(f) will be equal to the so called Mastrovito matrix Z, which is
multiplied by the column vector b to produce the result c.
Adding two vectors will be done by adding the corresponding entries. For ex-
ample adding
and
we get
V + W =[(vn + wn)
vnvn -1 v1v0
Wn-1 WI WO
(vn-1 + wn-1)...(v1 + W1)(vo + w0)
Also concatenation of vectors will be needed during the reduction algorithm.
This will be represented using the operatorII.For example, the above vectors V
and W, which are both of length (n + 1), can be concatenated to form a new vector
of length 2(n + 1), as follows
V W = [vnvn -1" V1VO Wn Wn-1 W1 W0I
Note that, in general, the equality of the lengths is not a requirement for the vectors
to be concatenated.
During the reduction, the vectors will be shifted to the right and left and the
new entries will be filled with zeros. For example (V3) and (V 4 2) represent
right and left shifts of the vector V, by 3 and 2 positions, respectively. For the vector
V =[vnVn-1vn -2 " V2V1the results will be
(V =
(V 4 2)
0 0 0 VnVn- V6V5V4V3 2
Vn-2Vn_3 Vn_4 Vn_5 Vn_6 V1V00 .
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Also, at some steps of the reduction, vectors will be usedas rows to form matrices.
For example, to form a matrix using the last (n1) entries of the above vectors, the
following notation will be adopted
V Vn-2Vn-3Vn-4Vn-5 V3V2ViV0
(V3) 0 VnVn- V71 - 2 V6V5V4V3
(V 4--2) Vn-4Vn_5Vn_6Vn _7 V2V100
3x (n-1)
As seen above, although the original vectors are longer, only the last (n1) entries
of each are used, and the rest is discarded.
A final note will be on special matrices that will be encountered frequently during
the reduction process. In mathematics literature, a matrix whose entries are constant
along each diagonal is called a Toeplitz matrix. Sum of two Toeplitz matrices is also
a Toeplitz matrix [16].This property will be used to establish a recursion in the
proposed method, as will be seen later.
11.3General Case
Let
p(x) = xnk + xn(k-1) ++ xni + xno
=xm+ xn(k-1) + - + xn1 + 1
be a general irreducible polynomial where no, n1,..., n(k- 1)nk are integers and
0 = no <n1 << n(k_i) < nk = m .
The difference between highest two orders will be denoted by A, i.e.,
A = nkn(k_1) = mn(k-1)103
First the overall processes will be summarized and then a method will be pro-
posed to find the same result efficiently.
When the irreducible polynomial is used to reduce the rows of LO), each row will
have k children. The one corresponding to the constant term xn°= 1, is guaranteed
to be added to a row in U, but the others might be added to the rows of L and
will need to be further reduced later. To simplify the notation and observe the
regularity, k additional matrices will be used. The children produced due to the
reductions corresponding to the xThi term will be added to the m x m matrix Xi(1),
for i = 0,1,... ,(k1). The children that fall back into the submatrix L will be
stored in L(1) to be reduced later.
By the introduction of Xi matrices, the matrix UM is preserved during the
reduction. At the end of the first step, i.e., when every row of matrix LO) is reduced
exactly once, the following matrices will be produced
where
= + X001)+ + ...+ X(k - 1) (1),
00 0 0 0 0 0
00 0 0 0 0 (ni1)
Xi(1)= 0am_iam-2 an, a2 al ni
00 am -1 ani+i a3 a2 (ni +
00 0 am_i am -n;(m1)
for i = 0,1,... ,(k1). The part of matrix M to be further reduced after the first
step, will beI(1)=
o o 11;:i) i(b1,)+1
0 00 , 1(,61)+3 /(,61,)+2
0 00 0 1(71,)2
0 00 0 0 (1)
0 00 0 0 0
0 00 0 0 0
0
1
(m2)
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As can be seen above, the new matrix L(1), that will be reduced in the next step,
is again triangular. That means the new children will again be in thesame form,
except that they will contain more zero terms at the beginning.
Thus it is clear that if the same procedure is recursively applied, the submatrix
I( °) will never change and the forms of the matrices Xi and L will remain thesame
after every step, i.e., Xi will all be trapezoidal and L will be triangular. The entries
that are zero and outside the indicated geometric regions after the first iteration, will
always remain zero. Only the values inside these regions will be changed during the
rest of the reduction. The number of nonzero rows of L after step j, i.e., number of
nonzero rows in L(?) can be denoted by
rj(m1)j(mn(k_o) = (m 1) j ,
as there are (m1) nonzero rows initially, i.e., 7-0 = (m1), and the number is
reduced by A = (mn(k_i)) after each step. Thus it will take
N[m, A] = 11
steps to reduce the whole matrix L(°). This number is also equal to the number of
nonzero terms in the row Lo at the end of step j, i.e., number of nonzero terms in
the row L(61) for j = 1,2,... ,N[m, A]1. Note that the range of j does not include
j = N[m, A], as the number of nonzero rows becomes zero after step N[m, A], but
the number r; will be negative for j = N[m, A]....
00000.0.0.000
OOOOO 000
Figure 11.1. Reduction of the lower submatrix
OOOOOO 0.
0.00
000
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First the matrix M is divided into the upper and lower submatrices UM and L(').
Then, as shown in Figure 11.1, LM is reduced into k matrices using the irreducible
polynomial, while UM is kept unchanged. Upper and lower parts of thenew matrices
are separated next (see Figure 11.2). While upper parts form the matrices Xi(1), lower
parts are accumulated into the matrix LW as shown in Figure 11.3, to be further
reduced in the next step. This procedure is repeated until the matrix L becomes the
zero matrix, i.e., all rows are reduced. The sum of the matrices in the last row, i.e.,
0°) and Xi(f) for i= 0, 1,...,(k1), yields the Mastrovito matrix Z.
The summary of the reduction will be as shown in Figure 11.4.
When a more detailed analysis is performed, one will see that all the submatrices
formed by the nonzero rows of the matrices produced after the first iterationare
Toeplitz matrices. When the matrix V') is reduced further, the children will be added
to the nonzero rows of the matrices Xi(1) and LP) which are Toeplitz submatrices. As
the sum of Toeplitz matrices is again a Toeplitz matrix [16], the submatrices formed
by the nonzero rows will all be Toeplitz submatrices again. And because theseare106
7
...
Figure 11.2. Separating the upper and lower parts
special Toeplitz matrices, computing only the first nonzero rows of Xi(f) will be
enough to reconstruct them. Similarly the matrix M, and hence the submatrices,
UM and IA,can be constructed using only the row Mm_i. Furthermore, since all
the first nonzero rows of the matrices Xi(f) are identical, it is enough to compute
only one of them. Thus it will suffice to work on only X0V).
Here is how the final X0V) is computed:
N[m4] -1
E 14i) = r.g) +141) +...+ L(oNfrn41-1)
j =o
This will be used with 10) to construct the final matrix Z.First, the rows Znt
are formed by adding the corresponding rows of the matrix 10) to Xq,), for i =
0, 1, ,(k1). Then they are extended to larger vectors Yi by concatenating the
necessary parts of U('), to their beginning, so that the shifts of Yi produce the rows
below them up to the row ni+1, or up to the row (m1) if i = (k1). This will
simplify the construction of the matrix Z. To further simplify the representations,107
+-- ro.
Figure 11.3. Accumulation of the lower parts
the first nonzero rows of Xi, which are all identical, will be represented by the vector
V will be used. And instead of referring to UM and 1,(°), the original multiplication
matrix M, or its entries ai will be used.
So here is the summary of the proposed method:
First compute V
N[rnA]-1
V =E LW)= [
J.0
using the recursive definition of
IA(?)=
Vm_i V3V2V1
(LW-1)(mni))
ru_1) > (mni)
(k-1)>i>0
(11.5)
(11.6)
for 1 < j < N[m, 0]1 to reduce everything to the sum of shifts of the row Lr,
or equivalently to the sum of rows in M. The above summation means that the row-+
108
4-
Figure 11.4. Reduction of the multiplication matrix for the general case109
LW-') is shifted by (mn(k_i)),(mnk-2), etc. until all the entries become zero.
Then all are added to form One performance note here: V is not computed
until it is totally reduced to the sum of rows of M, as there might be cancellations.
Then, compute Zni for i = 0,1,...,(k1) using the following recursive relations:
Z0= [ao]II [V]lx(m-1) [a0V-m-1Vm-2 V3V2V1
Zni =(Lf- M -m+n(2_1)]1xAi[Zn(2_1) > Adix(m-Ai)) + V,
where Ai = (nin(i_i)) for i = 1,2,...,(k1). Thus if
V= [ 0 Vm-iVm-2 V3v2 and
Zn(i_i) =[an(i_i)Wm-1 Wm-2 W3 W2 W1
then
Zni = [ani(ani-1Vm-1)
(11.7)
(an(,-1) + (wm-ivm-i-Az ) (wAi+ivi)
Next find Yi for i = 0,1,...,(k1) by extending Zni
Yi = [Mm+ni]1x(A(i+i)-1) II Zni
an(i+i)-1 an2+1 ani(ani-iVm-i)
(aoVm-ni) (wnz-1 + vm-n3-1) (wni+1 + v1)
Finally, the whole Z matrix can be constructed as follows:
(11.8)Z
11.3.1Analysis
YO
YO -+1
YO 1)
Y1
Y1 -4 1
Y(i1) -4 (Az1)
Yi
Yi -> 1
Y(k2) -4 (A(k_i.)- 1)
Y(k1)
Y(k1) 1
Y(k - 1)(A1)
771X711
0
1
(m1)
110
(11.9)
The formula of the vector V in Equation (11.5) includes shifts of LU), which finally
reduce to the shifts of row 14°) when the recursive formula is used. As all right
shifts of the row le) = MTh, are present in the original multiplication matrix M, it
is possible to represent the vector V as asum of rows of this matrix. Except for
the row itself, the minimum shift is A. Thus, in terms of the multiplication
matrix M, the shifted vectors will correspond toa subset of the rows of M, with the
minimum index being (m + A). After cancellations, the indices of therows will be a
subset S of the set of indices m, (m + A), (m + A + 1),...,(2m3), (2m2) The
first row with smallest index can be used asa base for the addition and the rest will111
be added to it. Thus the actual subset to be added to this base vector is (Smin S),
which will be called as S *. Asrow Mi has exactly (2m 1j) nonzero terms for
2m2 > j > m and as adding each nonzero term requiresa single XOR, the total
number of XOR gates required to compute the first form of V will be equal to the
SUM
E (2m 1j).
jES*
The delay in the computation of the vector V, can be minimized when the binary
tree method is used to compute the summation in each entry. As there are at most
IS I numbers to be added to compute any entry, the delay of computation will be
Flog2 SI] Tx, where 181 represents the order of the set S.
When the recursive relations in Equation (11.7) is used, construction of Zo re-
quires only rewiring and Zn, is then constructed by adding the vector V, to the
vector formed by concatenation, using (m1) XOR gates, as the vector V has only
(nt1) nonzero terms. Thusa total of (k1) (m1) XOR gates is needed to find
all Z,t for i = 1, 2,... ,(k1). As the time needed to compute a single row Zni is
Tx, the total delay to compute all is (k1)Tx.
The vectors YO and Y1 are then found using Equation (11.8) by only rewiring.
Construction of Z in Equation (11.9) is also done using only rewiring, as it only
consists of shifts.
To find the final result c(x) via the product c= Zb, m2 AND and m(m
1) XOR gates is needed. Each coefficient of the final result c(x)can be computed
independently via the product ci= Zib. All the multiplications can be done in one
level and the m terms can be added using the binary tree method in flog2 ml Tx
time.
Thus, overall computation for the general case requires m2 AND gates and
(m1)(m + k1) +(2m1j) (11.10)
;ES*
XOR gates. And the total delay of the circuit is
TA + Mog2 ISI1 + (k1) +flog2m1) Tx. (11.11)112
11.3.2Example
Let the irreducible polynomial be p(x)= x7 + x5 + x3 + x + 1. Then m = 7, k = 4,
n3 = 5 and A = 75 = 2. The standard reduction will reduce the last A = 2 rows
of matrix M at each step, and finds the final Z matrix in N[7, A] = IT1=121= 3
steps.
The standard reduction operations performed can be summarized as follows:
M
ao 000000
al ao 00000
a2 al ao 0000
a3 a2 al ao 000
a4 a3 a2 al ao00
a5 a4 a3 a2 al ao 0
as a5 a4 a3 a2 al ao
0 as a5 a4 a3 a2 ai
-->
ao0000 0 0
al ao 000 0 0
a2 al ao 00 0 0
a3 a2 al ao 0 0 0
a4 a3 a2 al ao as a5
a5 a4 a3 a2 al (ao + ao) (a5 + ao)
asa5 a4 a3 a2al (ao + a6)
0 as a5 a4 a3 (a2 + a6) (ai + as)
00 as a5 a4 a3 a2 00as a5 a4 a3 (a2+ a6)
000 as a5 a4 a3 000 as a5 (a4 + a6) (a3 + a5)
0000 as a5 a4 0000 as a5 (a4 + as)
00000 as a5 00000 0 0
000000 as 00000 0 0113
ao00 0 0
alao0 0 0
a2alao as a5
0
0
(a4 + as)
a3a2al(ao + as)(a5 + as)(a4 + a5 + as)
a4a3a2 al (ao + as)
a5a4a3(a2 + a6)(al + as)
asa5a4 a3 (a2 + as)
0asa5(a4 + a6)(a3 + a5)
00as a5 (a4 + as)
000 0 0
000 0 0
000 0 0
000 0 0
(a5 + as)
(ao + a4)
(al + as)
(a2 + a4)
(a3 + a5)
0
0
0
0
ao as as (a4 + a6)(a3 + as)
alao + a6) (a5 + a6) (a4+as+ae) (a3+a4-1-a5+a6)
a2al (ao + a6) (as + a6)
a3(a2 + a6) (ai + as) (ao + a4)
a4 a3 (a2 + a6) (a1 + a5)
a5 (a4 + as) (a3 + as) (a2 + a4)
a6 a5 (a4 + a6) (a3 + as)
(a4+as+a6)
(a3 + a6)
(ao + a4)
(al + a3)
(a2 + a4)
0
0
(a3 + as)
(as + a4 + a5 + as)
(a4 + a5 + as)
(a3 + a6)
(ao + a4)
(al + a3)
(a2+a4)
0
0
0
0
(a2 + a4)
(a2-Fa3-1-a4-Fa5 )
(a3A-a4+a5-1-04)
(a2+a5-1,243)
(a3 + a6)
(ao + a2)
(a1 + a3)
(a1 + a3)
(ai-Fa2+a3-Ea4)
(a2+a3 i-a4±a5)
(a1+47.4-Fa5-1-043)
(a2-4-a5+46)
(al + as)
(ao + a2)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The first 7 rows the above result will form the Z matrix.114
The proposed method will do the following to get the above result: First the
vector V is found using Equation (11.5)
N[7,5]-1
V = > LW) = + LW) + .
i=0
which can be computed using the recursive definition in Equation (11.6):
LW)= (LV-1)(7n,i))
ru_i) > (7n2)
3 > i > 0
Using this formula L(c1) and LOcan be reduced as follows:
LW) >2 (LV -÷ (7n2)) = (Lr -4 (75)) + (73))
3>i>0
6> (7ni)
(L,1°)2) + (LV4) = M9 + M11
L2)=E (LW)(7n2)) = 1.41) -4 (75)
3>i>0
(7ni) <4
((Lr+ 2) + (14°) ÷ 4)) -4 (75) = (g3)4) + (140) __÷ 6)
(140)_> 4)= M11
Thus the final form of the vector V will be
V = LV +LW) + le) = M7 ± (Mg + M11) ± Mll
= M7 + M9
=
=
[
+ [
[
0
0
0
as
0
as
a5
0
a5
a4
as
(a4 + as)
a3
a5
(as + a5)
a2
a4
(a2 + a4)
a1
a3
(a1 + as)
1,
]
]
As can be seen from above, S = {7, 9} and 5*{9}.115
Next compute Zo, Z1, Z3 and Z5 using the recursive relations in Equation (11.7):
Zo = [ao]II [V]ix (7_1)
aoa6 a5 (a4+ as)(a3 + a5)(az + a4)(ai + a3)
Z1 = ([M7]1x1 II [Zo -4 1]1),(7_1)) + V
=[ alao as a5 (a4 + a6)(a3 + as)(az + a4)
+ [0a6 a5(a4 + as)(a3 + as)(az + a4)(al + a3)
= [ al (ao -1-as) (a5+a6) (a4+a5 +a6) (a3+a4+a5 +a6) (a2-1-a3-i-a4+a5) (ai+a2-Ea3±a4)
Z3 = ([1\47+1]1x2 11[zi2]1x (7-2)) + V
=[ a3 a2 a1 (ao + as) (a5 + a6) (a4+a5+a6) (a3-i-a4+.5-i-a6)]
+ [0 a6 a5(a4 + as) (a3 + as) (az + al)(ai + a3) ]
=[ a3 (a2 + a6) (a1 + a5) (ao + a4) (a3 + a6) (a2-Fa5+a6) (ari-a4-1-a5+a6)]
Z5 = ([147+3]1 x 2II [Z3 ÷ 2]1x (7-2)) + v
= [a5 a4 a3 (az + as)(a1 + as)(ao + a4) (a3 + a6)I
+ 0 as a5 + a6) (a3 + a5)(a2 + a4) (al + a3)
[a5(a4 + a6)(a3 + a5) (az + a4)(a1 + a3)(ao + az) (a1 + as)]
Extending Zo, Z1, Z3 and Z5 using Equation (11.8) will result in the following vectors:
YO= [Mr]ix(i-1)Zo
= Zo = [ ao a6 a5 (a4 + as) (a3 + as) (az + a4) (al + a3)
Y1 = [Ms]lx(2-1) 11 Z1
=az al (ao + a6) (a5 + a6) (a4 + a5 + a6)
(a3 + a4 + a5 + a6) (a2 + a3 + a4 + as) (ai + az + a3 + a4) ]
Y2 = [Mlidix(2-1) II Z3
= [ a4 a3 (az + as) (ai + as)
(ao + a4) (a3 + as) (az + as + as) (al + a4 + as + as) ]
Y3 = [1\412]lx(2-1)11 Z5
= [ a6 a5 (a4 + a6) (a3 + as) (az + a4) (ai + a3) (ao + az) (ai + as) ]116
Finally the whole Z matrix can be constructed using the Equation (11.9):
YO
Y1
(Y1 -* 1)
Z = Y2
(Y2 -÷ 1)
Y3
(Y3 > 1)
7x7
a0 a6 a5(a4 + as)(a3 + a5)(a2 + a4)(ai + a3)
a1 (ao + a6) (a5 + a6) (a4+a5+a6) (a3d-a4+a5+a6) (a2+a3+a4-Fa5) (ai +a2+a3+a4)
a2al(ao + as) (a5 + as)(a4+a51-a6)(a3+a4+a5-I-a6)(a2+a3+a4+a5)
a3 (a2 + a6) (al + a5) (ao + a4)(a3 + a6) (a2+a5+a6)(ai+a4+a5-Fa6)
a4 a3(a2 + as) (ai + a5)(ao + a4)(a3 + a6) (a2+a5+a6)
a5 (a4 + a6) (a3 + a5) (a2 + a4)(ai + a3)(ao + a2)(al + a6)
as a5(a4 + a6) (a3 + a5)(a2 + a4)(al + a3)(ao + a2)
Note that the final matrix found using our method is the same as the one found
using the standard method.
There are 4 additions in the first computation of vector V and 3*6 additions in
the computation of rows Zi. The vectors Yi and the construction of the matrix Z
is done only using rewiring. To find the final result c(x) via the product c = Zb, 72
AND and 7* 6 = 42 XOR gates will be needed.
Thus, the overall computation for the general case requires 49 AND gates and
4 + 3 *6 +42 = 64 XOR gates.
To compute the required XOR gates, one can alternately use the Equation (11.10)
with S*{9}, m =7 and k = 4, which yields
(71)(7 + 41) + E (141j) = 60 + 4 = 64
jE {9}117
XOR gates. Using S= {7, 9} in Equation (11.11), the total delay of the circuit turns
out to be
TA ± (1-log2 21 + (41) + [log2 71 ) Tx = TA ± 7Tx
11.4Special Cases
When the irreducible polynomial hasa multiple with fewer terms or some special
form, the reduction ofsome higher terms can be simplified. These yield some sim-
pler multipliers. Binomial, trinomial, all-one-polynomial (AOP) and equally-spaced-
polynomial (ESP) cases will be studied.
11.4.1Binomials
When p(x) is binomial, it is always reducible, anda Galois Field can not be con-
structed using it. But still reduction bya binomial can be needed in some cases. For
example while doing a reduction using the AOP
p(x)xm-1xm,-2xm-3 x2xl+
1
the (x + 1) multiple of it, which will be the binomial
(x + 1)p(x) = xm ± 1,
can be used, to reduce the terms with order higher than m1. Thus, binomial case
will be presented to be usedas a base for the other special cases and for the sake of
completeness.
Let p(x) = xm + 1. When weuse this polynomial to reduce the rows of L03), each
row will have a single child and that child will be in U, as explained in the general
case. Furthermore the row number of the child in U will be the same as the reduced
row in L(°) . In that case, all the reduction can be done in a single step as follows:z = +
ao 0 0
a1 ao 0
a2 a1 ao
0
0
0
:
0
0
0
0
0
0
am_3 am_4 am -5 ao00
am-2 am-3 am-4 a1a00
am -1 am-2 am_3 a2a1a0
a0am_i am_2 a3a2 a1
al aoam_i a4a3 a2
a2 a1 ao a5a4a3
am-3 am-4 am-5 ao am-1 am-2
am_2 am_3 am_4 alaoam -1
am_i am_2 am_3 a2a1 ao
0 am_i am_2 a3a2
.
a1
00am_i a4a3 a2
00 0 a4a3
00 0 0am-1ant-2
00 0 -00 17,-m-1
00 0 00 0
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As can be seen above,we needed no gate to get the last matrix. And in fact all
can be done by just working on a single vector. Define the intermediate vector Y as
Y = [Mm -1 --->
am -1am-2 a2a1aoam_i am-2
Then the whole Z matrixcan be constructed as follows:
Y
Y --> 1
Y-+2
ao
al
a2
Z=
Y(m3)
Y(m2)
Y(m1)
-mxm
am_3
am_2
am_i
a2al
am-i am-2 a3a2ai
aoam_i - a4a3 a2
al a0 a5a4 a3
am-4 am-5 ao am -1am-2
am_3 am_4 ala0am_i
am-2 am-3 a2a1 ao119
11.4.1.1Analysis
Since Y is never processed, andas the rows of matrix Z can be obtained by only
rewiring, the final Z matrix costs nothing in terms of gates. To find the final result
c(x) via the product c= Zb, m2 AND and m(m1) XOR gates will be needed.
While computing c = Zb the multiplications can be done in one level and then
the outcomes can be added using the binary tree method. Using this procedure the
delay of the circuit will be
TA + ilog2 ml Tx.
11.4.2Trinomials
Let the irreducible polynomial be the trinomial
p(x) ± xn + 1
Note that A = m n in this case. The special case n= Ti will be treated as a special
case of the equally-spaced-polynomials (ESPs) later and will not be studied here.
First the overall processes for trinomials will be summarized and then a method
will be proposed to find the same result efficiently. When this irreducible polynomial
is used to reduce the rows of LO), each row will have two children. The one corre-
sponding to the constant term xn° = 1, is guaranteed to be in U, but the other might
need to be further reduced depending on the position of the parent row. To simplify
the notation and observe the regularity, two additional matrices will be used. The
reductions due to the constant term will always be added to the matrix XO, and the
reductions due to the xn term will always be added to Xl. At the end of the first
step, the following matrices will be produced:120
Z(1)= + X0(1) + X1(1)
a() 0 000 0 am_i am-2 a2al
a1 ao 000 00am_i a3 a2
am-3 am-4 a()00 00 0 am-1am_2
am_2 am-3 ala00 00 0 0am_i
am -1am-2 a2ala0
00 0 0 0
00 0 0 0 0 0
00 0 0 0 0(n1)
+0 am_i am_2 a2 a1 n
00am_i an+i a3a2(n + 1)
00 0 ap+i ap am -1 (m1)
0 0am_i aP+2 a0 1-1 0
0 00am_i aA4.3 aA+2 1
L P)
0 00 0 am_i am-2(n3)
0 00 0 0am_i(n2)
0 00 0 0 0 (n1)
0 00 0 0 0 (m2)
As can be seen above, the new matrix L(1) that will be reduced further is again
triangular. That means the new children will again be in the same form, except that
they will contain more zero terms at the beginning.
Thus it is clear that if the same procedure is recursively applied, as in the general
case, the submatrix 13(°) will never change and the forms of the matrices Xi and L121
will remain the same after every step, i.e., Xi will all be trapezoidal and L will be
triangular. The entries that arezero and outside the indicated geometric regions
after the first iteration, will remainzero. Only the values inside these regions will
be changed during the rest of the reduction. The number ofnonzero rows of L after
step j, i.e., number of nonzero rows in L(i) can be denoted by
rj = (m1)j(mn) = (m1)jA,
as there are (m1) nonzero rows initially, and the number of rows is reduced by
A = (mn) after each step. Thus it will take
N[m, A] = Imo11
steps to reduce the whole matrix L(°). This number is also equal to the number of
nonzero terms in the row L(T) at the end of step j, i.e., number of nonzero terms in
the row LW) for j = 1,2,...,N[m, A]1. Note that, similar to the general case, the
range of j does not include j = N[m, A], as the number of nonzero rows becomes
zero after step N[m, A], but the number ri will be negative for j = N[m, A].
When a more detailed analysis is performed, as in the general case, one will see
that all the submatrices formed by the nonzero rows of the matrices produced after
the first iteration are Toeplitz matrices. When the matrix L(1) is reduced further,
the children will be added to the nonzero rows of the matrices X0(1), X1(1), and
LP) which are Toeplitz submatrices. As thesum of Toeplitz matrices is again a
Toeplitz matrix [16], the submatrices formed by the nonzero rows will all be Toeplitz
submatrices again.And because these are special Toeplitz matrices, computing
only the first nonzero rows of X0(f) and X1(f) will be enough to reconstruct them.
Similarly the matrix M, and hence the submatrices, 0°) and L(°), canbe constructed
using only the row Mrn_i. Furthermore since the first row of X0(f) and the nth row
of X1(f) are identical, it is enough to compute only one of them. Thus it will suffice
to work on only X0V).
Here is how XOW) is computed:
Mm,A1-1
E 14,3) 140)Lw) Lv[mAi_i)
j=0122
But since for trinomials the recursive relation in Equation (11.6) simplifies to
(LW-1).4 (m-ni)) = (LW-i)(m-n)) = (Lo i) -÷ A)
r(j -1) > (mni)
1 > i > 0
X0V) becomes
Nfrn,A1-1
E (14,,()) -4 jA)= + (L(0°)A)+ (Lr(N[rri,- 1)A).
j =0
This will be used with UM to construct the final matrixZ. First, therows Zo
and Zn are formed by adding the corresponding rows of the matrix 0°) to X0(0f) and
X1W) and then theyare extended to larger vectors YO and Y1 by concatenating
the proper parts of UM to their beginning, so that the shifts of YO and Y1 produce
the rows below them.This will simplify the construction of the matrix Z.To
further simplify the representations, X0(0f) and XIV), which are all identical, will be
represented by the vector V. And instead of referring to UM and LM, the original
multiplication matrix M, or its entriesai will be used.
The vector V will be defined as
N[it,A]-1 N[m4]-1
V =E (LpjA) = E
j=0 j=0
=
[ 0 vvm_i vm_2 V3V2V1I
Before proceeding any further consider the following equality:
N[rn,0] -- 1
V =E (14°) -> jA)
j=0
NimAj-1
L° + E V -4 j°)
j=1
N[m4] -1
=0 +E (g))-4jA) + (Tr-4N[771, A]A)
N[m3.1.70+t (140)
j =1[E
(go)jA)]
N[m,A]-1
j=0
= + (v --÷ A)
-+0
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Note that the row (Lo ) -+ N[m, A]A) added to the sum above is a zero vector since
L(T) hasa zero at the first entry and is shifted at least (m1) positions to the right.
The above equality suggests the following recursive formula for the computation
of the entries of the vector V:
vi
0
ai
Vi±p
im ,
(m1)i > (n1)
(n1) > i > 1.
Formulas for Zo and Zn can be found using the general recursive formula in
Equation (11.7):
Zo = [ao]II [v]lx(m -1)
=[a0 vrn_2 V3 V2 V1
Zn = (Mn + (Vn)) + V
=[an (an_i + vm-1) (ao + vA) (vm-i + vA-1) (vn+1 + vi)
However, there are further simplifications here, which can be seen by comparing the
entries of Zn and Zo carefully. The first n entries in Zn are identical to the last n
entries of Zo, and thus need not be computed again, rewiring will be enough. This
can be proven using the recursive formula of the vector V in Equation (11.12)
(Z0 4- A) = (M0 4- A) + (VA)
= V4L
(14°) + (VA)) 4- A
=(L(T) E A) + ((V -* A) 4-- A)
= Mn + ((VA) 4- A).
During the double shift, the first n entries of the second term above is preserved, i.e.,
they are the same as in vector V. Thus the difference between the first 71 entries of124
the vectors (Z0A) and Zn, is only the vector (V > n). But since the first (n +1)
entries of the vector (Vn) are all zero, the vectors (Z0 ÷- A) and Zn agree in the
first n positions. Then during the computation of Zn, the firstn positions can be
produced by rewiring the lastn entries of Zo or V, as they are the same, i.e., [V]1xn.
Note also that the last A entries of thesum (Mn + (V ---> n)) is equal to
[(Z0 -4 = [aovm_i vn+i= [a0am -1 an+1
Note that the Equation (11.12) is used to substitutevi = ai for i = (n+1), ,(m-1).
So here is the summary of the proposed method:
First compute the vector V using the recursive definition in Equation (11.12).
Then compute Zo and Zn using:
Zo = [ao]II [V]ix(m-1) =ao vm-i vm-2
Zn = [V]1xn([V]1xA[(Zo >
[Vn V- n-1 Vi
[ VA VA_1
[ an Vn-1 Vi
vl+ao
V2 V1
am_i
(ao + vA) (am-i + vA-1) (an+1 + vi)
Next find YO and Y1 by extending Zo and Zn:
YO = iN4L--mj 1 x (n-1)11 Zo
[an-1an-2 ai
Y1 = 1M L-m-En
1j 1 x (A-1)11 Zn
r
ao Vm_i
am-1 am-2 an+1an
Vm_2 V2
Vn-1
v1(ao + vA) + vA-1)
V1
(an+ vi)I125
Finally the whole Z matrix can be constructed as follows:
YO ao VA+1 VA vl
YO -+ 1 ala0 V0 -1-2 V0 -I-1 V2
YO(n1) an-1 an-2 a0 vm-1 vn
Z= Y1 antin-1 vi(ao + v.6,) (an+i + v1)
Y1-41 an+1an v2 Vi (an+2 ± V2)
Y1(A2) am -2 am -3 -2/A_1VA_2 (am_iVA_1)
Y1 > (A1)
mxm
am -2 VP VA-1 (ao + vA)
(11.15)
Note that the vA_i type of entries for i > 0 in the last rows, is present only if their
indices are less than n. Otherwise they will be taken as
11.4.2.1Analysis
Computation of the vector V using the recursive relation in Equation (11.12) requires
only one XOR gate for each of the last (n1) entries which sums up to a total of
(n-1) XOR gates. The total delay is (N[m, LS.] 1)Tx as the entries can be computed
in blocks of A, no computation is needed for the first block and computations within
each block can be done in parallel.
Construction of Zo requires only rewiring. During the computation of Zn, the
first n positions are produced by rewiring, and only A XOR gates are needed to
compute the last A entries as each requires a single addition. This computation
takes Tx time, as all can be added in parallel. The vectors YO and Y1 are then
found using only rewiring.Construction of the matrix Z is also done using only
rewiring, as it only consists of shifts. To find the final result c(x) via the product
c = Zb, m2 AND and m(m1) XOR gates will be needed. And the delay for this last
part is TA + FlOg2 ml Tx when the binary tree method is used to compute the sums.126
Thus, overall computation for the trinomialcase requires m2 AND gates and
(n1) + A + m(m1) = m21
XOR gates. And the total delay of the circuit is
TA + (N[771, A] + [log2 ml) Tx= TA +Gm
A
1
1+ [log2nl)Tx. (11.16)
11.4.2.2Example
Let the irreducible polynomial be p(x)= x7 + x4 + 1. Then m = 7, n = 4. The
standard reduction will reduce the last A= 74 = 3 rows of matrix M at each
step, and finds the final Z matrix in N[7, 4]=1N1= 2 steps.
The operations performed by the regular reduction method can be summarized
as follows:
M=
ao 000000
al ao 00000
a2 al ao 0000
a3 a2 al ao 000
a4 a3 a2 al ao 00
a5 a4 a3 a2 al ao 0
as a5 a4 a3 a2 al ao
as a5 a4 a3 a2 al
ao 000 0 0 0
al ao 00 0 0 0
a2 al ao 0 0 0 0
a3 a2 ai ao as a5 a4
a4 a3 a2 al ao as a5
as a4 a3 a2al ao as
as a5 a4 as a2 al ao
0 as a5 a4 (a3 + as) (a2 + as) (ai + a4)
00 as a5 a4 a3 a2 00as a5 a4 (a3 + a6)(a2 + a5)
000 as a5 a4 a3 000 as a5 a4 (a3 + a6)
0000 as a5 a4 0000 0 0 0
00000 as a5 0000 0 0 0
000000 as 0000 0 0 0ao a6 a5 a4 (a3 + as) (a2 + a5) (al + a4)
al ao a6 a5 a4 (a3 + a6) (a2 + a5)
a2al ao a6 a5 a4 (a3 + a6)
a3 a2 al ao as a5 a4
a4(a3 + a6) (a2 + a5) (al + a4) (ao +a3 + as)(a2 + a5 + as)
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(a1 + a4 + a5)
a5
a6
a4
a5
(a3 + a6) (a2 + a5)
a4(a3 + as)
(al + a4)
(a2 + a5)
(a0 + a3 + a6) (a2 + a5 + a6)
(al + a4)(a0 + a3 + as)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The first 7 rows will form the Z matrix.
The proposed method will do the following:
First compute V, using the recursive relations in Equation (11.12):
V =[ 0]II
[ 0]
[a6 a5 a4] II[(a3v3+3) (a2 + v2+3)(al + vi+3)]
[a6 a5 a4 [(a3 + as)(a2 + a5) (a1 + a4)]
=0 a6 a5 a4 (a3 + a6) (a2 + a5) (al + a4)]
Then compute Zo and Z4 using Equation (11.13):
Zo = [ao]II [V]ix(7-1) = [ao a6 a5a4(a3 + as)(a2 + a5)(a1 + a4)]
Z4 = [V]lx4II([V]lx3[(Z04)]1x3)
[a4 (a3 + a6) (a2 + a6)(al + a4)]II
[(a3 + as) (a2 + a5)(al + a4)+ [ao a6 a5])
= [a4 (a3 + as) (a2 + a5) (a1 + a4)(a0-1-a3-1-a6)(a2+0,5-1-a6)(al -1-a41-a5)Next find the vectors YO and Y1 using Equation (11.14):
YO = [M7]ix(4-1) II Zo
=[a3 a2 a1 a0 as a5 a4(a3 + as)(a2 + as) + a4)
Y1 = [1\41.1]lx(3-1)if Z4
as a5 a4 (a3 + as) (a2 + a5)(a1 + a4)
(ao + as + as) (a2 + as + a2) (al + a4 + as)]
Finally the whole Z matrix can be constructed using Equation (11.15):
Z=
YO
YO -4 1
YO -}2
YO -÷ 3
Y1
Y1 -31
Y1 -4 2
7x7
a0 a6 a5
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a4(a3 + a6) (a2 + a5) (ai + a4)
al a0 a6 a5 a4(a3 + a6) (a2 + a5)
a2al ao as a5 a4(a3 + as)
a3 a2 al ao a6 a5 a4
a4 (a3 + a6) (a2 + a5) (a1 + a4) (ao-Fa3-Fa6) (a2+a5A-a2) (ai +a4+a5)
a5 a4 (a3 + a6) (a2 + as) (al + a4) (ao +a3 +a6) (a2-Fa5+a2)
a6 a5 a4 (a3 + a6) (a2 + as) (ai + a4) (ao +a3 +a6)
Note that the final matrix found using our method is the same as the one found
using the standard method.
There are 3 additions in the computation of the vector V. And Z4 is produced
using rewiring for the first 4 entries and 3 additions for the last 3 entries. The vectors
YO, Y1 and the construction of the matrix Z is done only using rewiring. To find
the final result c(x) via the product c = Zb, 72 AND and 7* 6 = 42 XOR gates will be
needed. Thus, the overall computation for the trinomial case requires 49 AND gates
and 3 + 3 + 42 = 48 XOR gates.
Note that the above results all agree with the results found theoretically.
The total delay of the circuit can be found using Equation (11.16) with m = 7
and A = 3
TA + + (log271)Tx = TA + 5Tx129
11.4.3Equally-Spaced-Polynomials
Let p(x) be an equally spaced- polynomial (ESP) withni = iA for i = 0, 1, ...,k and
m = nk = kA, i.e.,
p(x) = xnk + xnk-i + + XThixn°
xkAx(k-1)A x6.
A is called the spacing factor. Note that A still shows the difference between the
highest two orders as before, i.e., A= nkn(k_1). When the row M. of the initial
matrix M, is reduced, it produces children on rows
A), (j- 2A),..., (jk A),
for (j > (k + 1)A).Similarly when the child on row (jA) is further reduced, the
new children will be on rows
(.72A), (j 3A), ,(j(k + 1)A)
As all of these are identical the newones will cancel all of the old ones. The only
new child left will be the one on row (j(k + 1)A). Hence we can say that the only
offspring of the row MM for j > (k + 1)A will be added to the row (j(k + 1)A).
This is because, what effectively done above is reducing the row using the (x°+1)
multiple of the original irreducible polynomial p(x), which is
(x° + 1)p(x) x(k+i)A
All the rows in LM except the first A, can be reduced using this multiple. The first
A rows has to be reduced using p(x) itself. In terms of the matrix M, thismeans
that the rows M(k+op, M(k+op+i,M2771,_2 will be reduced using the multiple
(x° + 1)p(x) and the rows MkP, Mkp+1,M(k+i)p_i will be reduced using the
original polynomial p(x). Note that the first part of the reduction does not use any
addition as all the entries reduced will be added to the upper triangular section of
the matrix UM which consist of zeros. The second part of the reduction can be
managed using two different approaches.130
11.4.3.1First Solution
As before the proposed method will only compute Zn,= ZiA, for i = 0, ,(k1),
but without using the vector V this time. Firstwe define v = (ki1) to simplify
the notation. When the above procedure is used, therow Zip becomes
ZiP = (MiAMiA±(k+1)11)MkA
aip aip_1 ao 0 0akA-i a(i+06.-F1
+ [0akA-.1 a(v+i)A a(v+1)A-1 avA avA-1 al
= [aiP (20,-1 + akA-1) (ao + a(v+i)A) a(v+1)A.-1
avA (akA-1 + avA-i) (a(i+1),60-1 + al)
where we combined the first two vectors, as no gate is needed while adding them.
The combined vector has A consecutive zeros, except for the row Z(k_i)p which has
only A1. As a result of this and the leading zero in MkA, computing Zip, for
i = 0, ,(k 2) only requires ((k 1)A 1) additions, and Z(k_i)A requires (k 1)A
additions.
However there are further simplifications in the computation due to same addi-
tions appearing twice during the whole process. Using the definition of Zo, therow
ZvA is found as
Zvp = [avo (avP-1akp- 1) (aoa(i+1)A)a(i+1)A-1
acel(akA-1 + ai.6-1) (a(v+1).6.+1 + al)
As seen above, the first vA entries of therow Zvp are identical to the last vA entries
of the row Zip, and the last iA entries of the row Zvp are identical to the first iA
entries of the row Z. Thus to obtain the row Zvp, the only addition needed to be
carried out is (ao + a(i+i)A), the rest can be constructed by rewiring the row Zip and
the original matrix M.
For the case k odd, the row Z(k_i)A is
2
Z (ki)A =
2
a (k-1)(a (k-1)A1 -I--akix-i) (ao + a (k+1)A)a (k+1) A
2 2 2 2aa
a (k-1) A(akA_i + a (k-1)1) "(a(k+i)+al)I
2"a 2`-s-r-131
As can be seen above the first (k21)A and the last (k;1) A entries are identical. Thus
it is enough to compute the first (1c21)A entries and the term (ao + a(k +1) p) only.
2
So the proposed method computes the rows of the final matrix Z directly using
the following set of recursive relations:
Zip =
(MiA1\4(k+i+1)0)MkA
[Zvp]lxiA IIRao + a(v+i)A)a(v+1)0 -1
avp][Zvp --+ (i1)A]lxv.a.
[aiA (aiA-1 + akA-1)(ao + a(i+i)A) a(i+i)A-1
- -aiA (akA_i + aiA-1)(a(i+1)A+1 + al)]i = k- 21 for k odd
(11.17)
where for k odd, the last (iz1) entries in the i = k21 case is not computed, but
rewired using the first part of the same vector.
Next find YiA for i = 0, 1,.,(k1) by extending Zip:
0 < <[j
1kIfi < < (k1),6,
YiA = [Mni+JA]ix(A-1) II Zip
[a(i+i)A-iaiA (aiA-i + akA-1) (ao + a(v+1)A) a(v+1)A-1
awl (akA-i + avA_i) (a(i+i)A+1 + al)
Finally, the whole Z matrix can be constructed as follows:Z
YO
YO -4 1
YO(A1)
YD
YD 1
Y(i1)A(A1)
YiA > 1
Y(k2)46. -4 (A1)
Y(k1)A
Y(k1),A, 1
Y(k1)0 > (A1)
11.4.3.2Analysis of the First Solution
rnx771.
0
1
(m1)
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For the case k even, the rows Zip, with indices i = 0, ,k-22 can be computed using
(k 1)A 1 additions each, and then the rows for i = t, ,(k 1) can be computed
using one addition each, which sums up to a total of
(k
2± 1)((k1)A1)(k 1+1) =k(k1)A
2 2
additions.
For the case k odd, as the first (k;') A and the last (k21) A entries in the row
Z(k_i)A are identical, it is enough to compute the first (k-21) A additions only. The
2
rows Zip, with i = 0, ,(k21)1 can be computed using (k-1)A 1 additions each,133
and then the rows with i = (k+21), ,(k1) can be computed using one addition
each as in the previous case, which sumsup to a total of
(k1)
((k1)A1) +
(k1)A
+ [(k1)(
(k1) (k1)
kA + 1) + 1] =
2 2 2 2
additions.
Thus in both casesk(k
2
1).n.=
2
ni(k-1)additions, i.e., XOR gates are needed to
compute the rows Zip matrix. The vectors Yi0 and the final matrix Z can be
found using only rewiring. Also m2k2A2AND and m(m1) XOR gates are needed
to find the final result c(x) via the product c = Zb. Hence the overall computation
for this special case requires m2 AND gates and
m(2 1)
+ m(m1) = m2 + m(k3)
XOR gates.
Note that the total delay of the circuit that computes the matrix Z is only Tx
as all entries only requires a single addition and can be computed in parallel. The
final product c = Zb can be computed by a doing products in the first layer and
then using the binary tree method to add the results. The total delay of the circuit
will then be
TA + (1 + (10g2 ml) TX
11.4.3.3Second Solution
There is also another approach that depends on the observation that the last vector
used in the computation of Zip is always the same row, i.e., MkA = Mm. Then
the contribution of this vector can be computed separately and can be added to the
contribution of the other vectors for each row. That is the result ci6, = Zi,6,13 can be
partitioned as
= ZiAb = ViAb + ZiOb ,
where Z'b contains the contribution of the first two vectors in the definition of Zip
in Equation (11.17) and Z"b contains the contribution of the last vector. However,134
since the results are not vectors but numbers, shifting cannot be applied to construct
the rows of c with indices that are not multiples of A. Then one has to construct
the whole matrices Z' and Z". Still there will be simplifications as there are only A
different rows in the matrix Z".
In terms of the row ci this corresponds to the partition
ci = Zib = (Mi + Mi+(k+i)0)b + MkA+jb
where ij (mod A) and 0 < j <
The result c is then directly found by using these entries.
11.4.3.4Analysis of the Second Solution
(11.20)
As shown before the sum (n+mi+(k+1)A) requires no addition and has Z consecu-
tive zeros, except for the rows Z(k_i)p+i with 0 < 1 < A, where it has only (A 1 0
zeros.
Thus the first product requires
(k1)AAND(k1)A1XORgates f o ri = 0, ,(k1),A.1,
((k1)+ 1 + 1) AND((k1)A + OXOR gates fori = (k1)A,kA1
Since the row Mkp±j has (kAj-1) non-zero terms, the second product requires
(kAj1)ANDand(kAj2)XOR
gates for 0 < j < A. Another XOR gate is needed for the final sum of each row. Thus
to compute the result using this second approach
(k1) A((k1) A) +
A-1
[E(k1)A + 1 +
1=0
+
A-1
[EkAj
1] j=0
k2% 2m2
AND gates and
A-1
11 A-1
(k1),6((k1)A1) +[E(k1)A ± [k 2]+ kA = m2-O
i=o
XOR gates are required.135
AR vector products can be carried out in parallel. The bottleneck for the delay
is the last row in the first product, i.e., when 1= (A1), where two full vectors
of length m are multiplied. When the binary tree method is used to compute the
additions, the total delay becomes
TA + (1 + flog2 ml ) Tx
where 1Tx is the delay of the final vector sum.
11.4.3.5Comparison of the Two Solutions
The delay and the number of AND gates needed are equal in both solutions.For
k > 2,
m2 ±m(k
2
3)> m2 > m2 A,
i.e., the second solution uses less XOR gates. And for k= 2, i.e., for the special
trinomials xm + x 2 + 1, both solutions uses the same number of XOR gates as
m2 ±(k3) 2in 2 A = 771 = 771 La.
In conclusion, the second solution is always better, but for trinomials the first
solution can also be used, as well.
11.4.3.6Example
Let the irreducible polynomial be the ESP
p(x) = x6 ± x3 + 1.
Then A = 3 and m = kA = 6.
As k = 2, the both solutions have the same efficiency. So to present and compare
the solutions, both cases, along with the general reduction, will be presented.
The multiple (x31)p(x) will be
(x3 + 1)p(x)= X9 1.136
In the proposed methods, the rows M9 and M10, will be reduced using this
multiple and the rows Mg, M7 and M8 will be reduced using the original polynomial.
The standard reduction will proceed as follows:
M=
ao
ai
a2
a3
a4
a5
0
0
0
0
0
0
ao
al
a2
a3
a4
a5
0
0
0
0
0
0
ao
al
a2
a3
a4
a5
0
0
0
0
0
0
ao
al
a2
a3
a4
a5
0
0
0
0
0
0
ao
al
a2
a3
a4
a5
0
0
0
0
0
0
ao
al
a2
a3
a4
a5
-4
0,0
ai
a2
a3
a4
a5
0
0
0
0
0
0
ao
al
a2
a3
a4
a5
0
0
0
0
0
0
ao
al
a2
a3
a4
a5
0
0
0
0
0
0
ao
al
a2
a3
a4
a5
0
0
a5
0
0
0
ao
al
a2
a3
a4
0
0
a4
a5
0
0
0
ao
al
az
a3
0
0
-4
ao
al
a2
a3
a4
a5
a5
ao
al
(a2 + a5)
a3
a4
a4
a5
ao
(a1 + a4)
(a2 + a5)
a3
a3
a4
a5
(ao + a3)
(a1 + a4)
(a2 + a5)
(a2 + a5)
a3
a4
a2
(ao + as)
(al + a4)
(al + a4)
(a2 + a5)
a3
al
a2
(ao + a3)
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
The first 6 rows form the matrix Z.137
The first solution starts by computing Zo and Z3 first, using Equation (11.17):
Zo = (Mo + Mg) + Ms
=( [ao 0 0 0 0 0 ]
+ [0 0 0 0 a5 a4 ])
+ [0 a5 a4 a3 a2 al ]
= [ao 0 0 0 a5 a4 ]
+[0 a5 a4 a3 a2 al ]
= [ao a5 a4 a3 (a2 + a5)(ai + a4)]
Z3 = [a3(a2 + as)(al + a4)(ao + a3) a2
YiA is then found using Equation (11.18):
YO = [M6]lx2Zo
=[a2alao a5 a4 a3 (a2 + as)(al + a4)]
Y1 =[Mo]ix2 II Z3
=[a5a4a3(a2 + a5)(al + a4)(ao + a3) a2
Then the whole Z matrix can be constructed using Equation (11.19), as follows:
Z=
Y0
YO 1
YO 32
Y1
Y1+1
Y12
7x7
ao a5 a4 a3(a2 + a5) (al + a4)
al a() a5 a4 a3(az + a5)
a2al ao a5 a4 a3
a3 (a2 + a5) (al + a4) (ao + a3) a2 al
a4 a3(az + a5) (al + a4) (ao + a3) az
a5 a4 a3(a2 + a5) (al + a4) (ao + a3)
3 XOR gates are needed to construct Zo and Z3. m2 = 36 AND and m(m1) = 30
XOR gates are needed to find the final result c(x) via the product c = Zb. Hence the
overall computation for this special case requires 36 AND gates and 3 + 30 = 33 XOR
gates. The total delay is (TA + 4Tx).138
In the second solution, the column vector Z'b is computed first
ao 0 0 0 a5 a4 bo a0b0 + a5b4 + a4b5
Z'b =
al ao 0 0 0 a5
a2 al ao 0 0 0
b aibo + aobi + a5b5
azbo + a1b1 + aobz
a3 a2 al ao 0 0 b3 a3bo + a2b1 + a1b2 + aob3
a4 a3 a2 a1 ao 0 b4 a4bo + a3b1 + a2b2 + a1b3 + aob4
a5 a4 a3 a2 a1 ao b5 a5b0 + a4bi + a3b2 + a2b3 + a1b4 + a0b5
which requires 24 multiplications and 18 additions. Then the column vector Zia is
computed
Z"b =
0 a5 a4 a3 a2 a1
00a5 a4 a3 a2
0 00a5 a4 a3
0 a5 a4 a3 az al
0 0a5 a4 a3 a2
0 00a5 a4 a3
bo
b2
b3
b5
=
a5b1 + a4b2 + a3b3 + a2b4 + a1b5
a5b2 + a4b3 + a3b4 + a2b5
a5b3 + a4b4 + a3b5
a5b1 + a4b2 + a3b3 + a2b4 + a1b5
a5b2 + a4 b3 + a3b4 + a2b5
a5b3 + a4b4 + a3b5
As noted before there are only A= 3 different rows in matrix Z"b, so computing it
requires 5 + 4 + 3 = 12 multiplications and 4 + 3 + 2= 9 additions, and adding it
to the column vector Z'b requires 6 additions. Thus a total of 24 + 12 = 36 AND and
18 + 9 + 6 = 33 XOR gates are needed to find the final result c(x) directly using the
second solution. The total delay is (TA + 4Tx).
Since k = 2 for the trinomials both solutions required exactly the same number
of gates and have the save delay.
11.4.4All-One-Polynomials
Let the irreducible polynomial be the all-one-polynomial (AOP)
p(x) = xnkxnk_i xn,xno xkx(k-1)++ x + 1
i.e., ni =i for i = 0,1, ,k and m = nk = k.139
This is a special case of ESP with A= 1. So all the rows, except the first one,
in the lower submatrix can be reduced using the multiple
(x +1)p(x) = x(k+1) +1.
This produces the partial result
ao 0am_i am_2 a3a2al
a1 ao 0am_i a4a3a2
a2 a1 ao 0 a5a4a3
a3 a2al ao a6a5a4
am_3 am_4 am_5 am_6 a00am_i
am_2 am_3 am_4 am_5 alao0
am_i am_2 am_3 am_4 a2ala0
0 am_2 am_3 a3a2al
0 0 0 0 00 0
0 0 0 0 00 0
0 0 0 0 000
0 0 0 0 00 0
0 0 0 0 00 0
The first row in lower submatrix has to bereduced using the original irreducible
polynomial p(x). One of the two solutions proposed in the ESP case can be used
here.
11.4.4.1Analysis
As before, both solutions require m2 AND gates and the delay is
TA + (1 + (log2 ml) Tx
in both cases. The second solution requires m21 XOR gates since A = 1. The XOR
gates needed to apply the first solution depends on the choice of p(x), but it always140
uses at least m2 XOR gates, except for the case p(x) = x2 + x + 1 which requires
m21 --2n- = 3 gates. So for all other cases the second solution is better.
11.4.4.2Example
Let the irreducible polynomial be the AOP
p(x)=xio±xs+x8±x7±x6±x5±x4±x3±x2+x±i
Then m = k = 10 and A = 1. The multiple (x + 1)p(x) then will be
(x + 1)p(x) = xil + 1.
The second method will compute the column vectors
ao0a9a8a7asa5a4a3a2 b0
ala00a9a8a7a6a5a4a3 b1
a2alao0asa8a7a6a5a4 b2
a3a2aiao0a9a8a7a6a5 b3
a4a3a2alao0asa8a7a6 b4 Vb =
a5a4a3a2alao0a9a8a7 b5
a6a5a4a3a2alao0asa8 b6
a7a6a5a4a3a2alao0as b7
a8a7a6a5a4a3a2alao0 b8
asa8a7asa5a4a3a2alao b9
and141
Zgb =[0a9a8a7a6a5a4a3a2al
bo
bl
b2
b3
b4
b5
b6
b7
b8
b9
= a9bi + a8b2 + a7b3 + a6b4 + a5b5 + a4b6 + a3b7 + a2b8 + albs
Computing Z'b require 9 * 9 + 10= 91 AND gates and 8 *9 + 9 = 81 XOR gates.
Similarly computing Zgb require 9 AND gates and 8 XOR gates. The final result is
found by adding the result of the product Zgb, toevery row of Z'b, which uses
another 10 XOR gates.
Thus the total number of gates required to find the resultc is 100 AND gates and
99 XOR gates, which agrees with the theoretical results found.
The bottleneck operation for the delay is the multiplication V9b, which takes
(TA + flog2 101 Tx) time, assuming that the binary tree method is usedto add the
terms. Adding Zgb to this result takes another Tx time. Thus the total delay of the
circuit becomes (TA + 5Tx).142
Chapter 12
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter summarizes the results of the thesis, lists themost significant contri-
butions and finally discusses future research directions in this largely unexplored
area.
12.1Discussion of Results
Chapter 9 is based on the paper [19]. In this chapter,we proposed a table lookup
based reduction method for performing the standard and Montgomery multiplica-
tion and squaring operations in GF(2k) using the polynomial basis. The proposed
method yields word-level algorithms, enabling software implementations of the fi-
nite field arithmetic operations which find applications most notably in ellipticcurve
cryptography. We treated the special irreducible polynomials and the integercase
in detail and gave the algorithmic details for these methods together with thecom-
plexity analysis in terms of the number of basic arithmetic operations. The proposed
algorithm is more efficient than the previously published results, and in thecase
of special irreducible polynomials (particularly, trinomials), the proposed method
reduces to already known algorithms found in the literature.
In the integer case, the right-to-left version of the algorithm works well, providing
an efficient version of the Montgomery multiplication algorithm. However, the left-
to-right version is not efficient mainly due to the fact that the most significant words
of the integer multiples of the modulus are not unique.
Chapter 10 is based on the paper [18]. The proposed parallel algorithm requires
0(s logs) arithmetic operations using 2sprocessors. Additionally there are some
table lookup operations performed by the server, and there is also the communication143
overhead. The sequential multiplication algorithm using the table lookup method
given in [19] requires s2 MOLOF2 and 3s2 XOR operations, therefore,a total of 0(s2)
arithmetic operations. Thus, the efficiency of the parallel algorithm proposedturns
out to be
82 1
(S2 logs)logs
The parallel algorithm is highly suitable for hardware implementation. Forex-
ample, by selecting w = 8 and L= 40, we can implement GF(216°) arithmetic, which
is desired in several applications of ellipticcurve cryptography [46]. By selecting spe-
cial irreducible polynomials, for example, trinomialsor all-one-polynomials, we may
not have a need for the tables T and f and the reduction operation will be greatly
simplified [19]. A hardware implementation of this algorithm would be highly useful.
Chapter 11 is based on the paper [17]. In this chapter,a general new method is
introduced to implement Mastrovito multipliers for all polynomials. When applied
to a given specific irreducible polynomial the space complexity, i.e., the number of
gates required, and the time complexity, i.e., the total delay of the architecture, of
the proposed method turns out to bevery efficient. The special cases described have
the same efficiency as the best known architectures proposed to date.
The multiplier for the special generating trinomial
xmx1
is shown to use (m21) XOR and m2 AND gates [39, 40, 54, 55]. The methodwe
proposed also requires (m21) XOR and m2 AND gates, moreover, it is applicable for
general trinomials. This result agrees with the best known architectures [31].
Paar [31] conjectured that the space complexity of the Mastrovito multiplier
would be the same for all trinomials. While (m2-1) XOR and m2 AND gates seemed like
a natural lower bound for Mastrovito multipliers, and Koc and Sunar [31] proposed
an architecture for trinomials of the form
xm + x7f +1,
that only requires (m2TLI) XOR and m2 AND gates. In this chapter,a more general
multiplier that requires only (m2A) XOR and m2 AND gates is proposed for the144
equally spaced polynomials, where A is the spacing factor (seepage 129).Our
multiplier improved the best-known algorithm for thiscase, which uses (m21) XOR
and m2 AND gates [21]. Furthermore, the methodcan also be applied to the special
forms of the equally-spaced-polynomials, suchas trinomials of the form
xm + x +1
and the all-one-polynomials. In bothcases our algorithm achieves the best known
lower bounds, as given in [32, 31].
12.2Summary of Contributions
Below is the summary of the contributions made:
A new word-level serial reduction algorithm for integers and polynomials (al-
ternative to division-based reduction)
A new word-level serial reduction algorithm for polynomials (alternativeto the
Montgomery multiplication)
Two simplified versions of the above algorithms applicable to trinomials and
all-one-polynomials
A new word-level parallel multiplication algorithm for polynomials using PRNS
(two versions)
A general Mastrovito multiplier architecture for polynomials
Four simplified versions of the above architecture for special polynomials
Improvement on the best-known Mastrovito multiplier architecture for equally-
spaced-polynomials
Detailed analyses of all methods proposed
In some special cases [45, 32], the canonical basis is equivalent to the normal
basis, and the proposed multipliers can also be used for normal basis multiplication by145
rewiring. However, we believe there will be further improvements if the architectures
are designed specifically for the normal basis.
Our analyses ignore the communication overhead, which can be crucial in some
cases.Also the design of the algorithms were not architecture oriented.Future
research with these in mind might yield more efficient algorithms and totally different
approaches.146
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Appendix A
NOTATIONS & DEFINITIONS
2 cyclic group cyclic group with n elements
G ® H direct sum direct sum of additive groups
Fq finite field The unique finite field with q = pm elements,
where p is a prime
Halgebraic closureif H = Fq then H = U Fq.
m>1
F* = Fq{0} the Abelian group formed by the nonzero
elements of the finite field Fq
GF(q) Galois field Galois field equivalent to Fq
8*= (Smin 8)the subset of S with minimum element removed
order of S the number of elements in the set S
Euler phi function number of integers less than and relatively
prime to 0(n) = nri1
pin(p155
E(F)F-rational pointsthe set of points on the elliptic curve
both of whose coordinates lie in the field F
#E(F)order of E(F)the number of elements in the set E(Fp)
Te Te function the function Te : F2m F4 defined by:
Te(a) = a+ a22 + a24 ++ a2"1-2
Trtrace functionthe linear function Tr : F2m F2 defined by:
Tr(a) = a+ 2' + a22 ++ a2m-1
Nnorm functionthe function N : F2m F2 defined by:
Tr(a) = a a21a22-a2m-1
(;)
Legendre symbolFunction that maps a to ±1 depending on
whether x is a quadratic residue modulo p
or not, i.e.,
0,if pla
+1,if a is a quadratic residue (mod p)
1, if a is not a quadratic residue (mod p)
x quadratic character Function that maps n E F to ±1 depending
on whether or notn has a square root in the
field F, i.e.,
0,if x = 0,
+1,if n has a square root in F,
1,if n has no square root in F.156
L[n, c, a]subexponential time Time complexity of an algorithm that is
asymptotically faster (resp. slower) than
an algorithm whose running time is
fully exponential (resp. polynomial) in
the input size n. It is defined as:
0(exp((c + o(1))(1nn)"(1n1nn)1 -Q))
II concatenationused to build a new vector from others
(see page 101 for an example)
--> 4right & left shiftused to shift a vector to right or left
(see page 101 for an example)
U
matrix construction used to construct an n x m matrix using
W
- nxm
the given n vectors (of various lengths)
as rows (see page 102 for an example)
TA AND delay the delay of a single 2-input AND gate
Tx XOR delay the delay of a single 2-input XOR gate
N[n, m] n7;zil a notation used in Section 11 to count
the number of steps in the analysis157
Appendix B
ALGORITHMS
B.1Repeated square-and-multiply method
Let G be a multiplicatively written finite group of order 71, and a3 E G. The
number or group operations used is at most 211og211. (Source: [46])
Input: a E G, 1 E
Output: at
1. Let (btbt_ibibo), be the binary representation of 1, where bi E 10,11 and
bt = 1.
2. Set #a
3. For i from t1 down to 0 do
If bt = 1 then
4. Output #
B.2Repeated double-and-add method
Let G be a additively written finite group of order n, and a, # E G. The number or
group operations used is at most 2 r1og211.(Source: [46])158
Input: a E G, 1 E Z
Output: al
1. Let (btbt_ibibo), be the binary representation of 1, where bi E {0, 1} and
bt = 1.
2. Set 0 4-- a
3. For i from t1 down to 0 do
If bi = 1 then
< +a
4. Output 0
B.3Euclidean Algorithm
This algorithm computes the greatest common divisor of 2 numbers a and b by
repeated divisions. The number of steps is at most 2 log2(max{2a, 2b}).(Source:
[66])
Input: Two integers a and b such that a > b
Output: integer d which is the greatest common divisor of a and b, i.e., d = (a, b)
1. Let i = 0, rt = a and rt+1.
2. Divide rt by rt+i and get the quotient qt±i and remainder rt+2, i.e.,
ri = ri+igi+i + ri+2 with 0 < rt+2 < 7-1+1
3. If ri+2 = 0 then set d = rt+i and go to next step. If ri4.2 0 0 then increment i,
i.e., i = i + 1, and go to step 2.
4. Output d.159
B.4Pollard's (p1) Algorithm
If n has a factor p, such that (p1) has no large prime divisor, then the following
method is virtually certain to find p. (Sources: [29, 66])
Input: A composite number n
Output: A factor p of n
1. Choose an integer v that is a product of small primes to small powers. (For
example take k = lcm [1, 2, 3,... ,u], for some small number u)
2. Choose an arbitrary integer a such that 1 < a < n.
3. Compute (a (mod n)).
If it is greater then 1, then it is a non-trivial factor of n; set p to that value
and go to step 7.
Otherwise go to step 4.
4. Compute (av (mod n)) by the repeated square-and-multiply method.
5. Compute d = gcd(av1, n) using Euclidean algorithm and the residue of a'
modulo n from step 4.
6. If d = 1 then go to step 1 and choose a larger v.
If d = n then go to step 2 and choose another a.
Otherwise 1 < d < n will hold and d will be a non-trivial divisor. Set p to d
and goto step 7.
7. Output p.160
B.5Lenstra's Elliptic Curve Factoring Algorithm
This is a probabilistic algorithm that uses elliptic curves. (Sources: [29, 66, 36]) For
a simpler version with complexity analysis see [5].
Input: A composite number n
Output: A factor p of n
1. Check that gcd(n, 6) = 1 and that n doesn't have the form ne. for some r > 2.
2. Choose random integers b, xi,Y1 between 1and n.
3. Let c =4bxi (mod n), let C be the cubic curve
C:y2=x3+bx+c
and let P = (Yi.,x1) E C.
4. Check that gcd(4b3 + 27c2, n) = 1.(If it equals n, go to step 2 and choose a
new b. If it is strictly between 1 and n then it is a non-trivial divisor. Set p to
that value and goto step 8.
5. Choose an integer v that is a product of small primes to small powers. (For
example take v = lcm [1, 2,3,...,u], for some small number u)
6. Compute
(au1),
7. Compute D = gcd(d, n).
If D = 1, either go to Step 5 and increase v or go to Step 2 and choose a new
curve. If D = n, then go to Step 5 and increase v.
Otherwise 1 < D < n will hold and d will be a non-trivial divisor. Set p to D
and go to Step 8.
8. Output p.161
Appendix C
THEOREMS
Theorem C.1 (Chinese Remainder Theorem,[25]) The solution of the system
p (mod m1)
P2--=p (mod m2)
PL = p (mod mr,)
is unique with respect to modulus M= Mimi for pairwise relatively prime moduli
L > i > 1. It can be computed using
where
p
[L
E pi (Mil mod mi) Mimod M,
i=i
Adi =
M
= rn1m2 "mi-imi+i 774., mi
and, the inverse Mr' (mod mi) is definedas
MI' Mi =1 (mod mi)
which exists since gcd(Mi,mi) = 1 and allmis are pairwise relatively prime.
Theorem C.2 (Prime Number Theorem,[2]) If ir(n) is defined as the number
of primes less than 11, then
rr(n)
Ti
log n162
Appendix D
NOTES ON FINITE FIELDS
Zn is a finite field if and only if n is a prime number.
If the characteristic m of a field is not 0, then it is a prime number. And that
field contains a subfield having m elements. This subfield is called ground field
of the original field.
If F is a finite field of characteristic p, then it contains pm elements for some
positive integer n.Furthermore, such a field exists for every prime p and
positive integer n.
If Zp[x]l f (x) is the set of all equivalence classes in Zp[x] under the congruence
modulo the irreducible polynomial f(x) of order n, then it forms a field with
pn elements.
For every non-zero element a E GF(q), the identity aq-1 = 1 holds. Further-
more, an element a E GF(qm) lies in GF(q) itself if and only if aq = a.
In every field F = GF(q) there exists a primitive element.
The minimal polynomial of an element a E Fp*ic is unique and is an irreducible
polynomial given by
ma (x) (x ,
SEC(a)
where C(a) is the set of conjugates of a with respect to GF(p), i.e.,
C(a)
To simplify multiplication of polynomials, one can precompute the z(i) values
such that 1 + ai = az(i). The table formed in that way is called a Zech's log
table.x (seequadratic character)
(seeEuler phi function)
Abelian group
rank 14
type 14
addition rules 12
admissible change of variables 17
algebraic closure 11
all-one-polynomial 72, 138
AOP(seeall-one-polynomial)
baby-step giant-step method 24
bases
normal 49
optimal normal 52
binomial 117
children 101
Chinese Remainder Theorem 161
concatenation 101
conjugates 162
CRT(seeChinese Remainder Thm)
cryptosystems
elliptic curve 9
private key 5
Index
public key 6
ElGamal 9
RSA 8
Diffie-Hellman key exchange 6
Diffie-Hellman problem 7
digital signature 6
discrete logarithm 24
Discrete Logarithm Problem 7, 24
square root methods 24
baby-step giant-step method 24
Pollard p method 25
Pohlig-Hellman method 26
index calculus method 26
discriminant 20
division polynomials 15
char(F) = 2 case 38
char(F)2, 3 case 35
DLP(seeDiscrete Logarithm Problem)
easy 7
EC(seeelliptic curve)
ECLP (Elliptic Curve
Logarithm Problem) 28
elliptic curveaddition formulas
general 12
char(F) = 2 case 18
char(F)2, 3 case 19
addition rules 12
crypt osystems 9
definition 11
discriminant 20
equation 11
group law 11
isomorphic 17
isomorphism classes 21
non-sup ersingular 21
supersingular 22
j-invariant 20
Lenstra's algorithm 160
logarithm problem (ECLP) 28
non-singular 19
non-supersingular 20
point at infinity 11
rational point 11
singular 19
supersingular 20
equally-spaced-polynomial 129
spacing factor 129
ESP(seeequally-spaced-polynomial)
Euclidean Algorithm 158
Euler phi function 154
factor base 26
164
finite field(seeGalois Field)
Galois Field 49, 154
notes 162
GF(seeGalois Field)
ground field 162
Hamming weight 52
hard 7
Hasse's theorem 13
index calculus method 26
isomorphism classes(seeEC)
isomorphic curves 17
j-invariant 20
left-to-right reduction algorithm 57
Legendre symbol 155
Lenstra's elliptic curve algorithm 160
Massey-Omura 97
Mastrovito matrix 101
matrix construction using vectors 102
message expansion 40
minimal polynomial 162
MONMUL63
MONSQU64
MULGF250
MOV attack 29
non-singular
elliptic curve 19
point 19non-supersingular 20
norm function 155
normal basis 49
optimal 52
n-torsion point 15
one-time pad 6
one-way function 7
optimal normal bases 52
order (of a)
curve 13
point 15
set 154
Pohlig-Hellman method 26
point at infinity 11
point compression technic 40
Pollard's (7)1) algorithm 159
Pollard p-method 25
Polynomial Residue Number
System (see PRNS)
prime number theorem 161
private key 7
private key cryptosystem 5
PRNS (Polynomial Residue
Number System) 79
PRNS-based algorithms 81
exponentiation 95
modified multiplication 90
multiplication 84
public key 7
165
public key cryptosystem 6
quadratic character 155
rank of an Abelian group 14
rational point 11
reduction algorithms
left-to-right TLBR 57
right-to-left TLBR 57
repeated double-and-add 157
repeated square-and-multiply 157
right-to-left TLBR algorithm 57
RSA cryptosystem 8
Schoof 32
Schoof's algorithm 33, 35
Single Radix Conversion 81
algorithm 81
modified algorithm 90
singular
elliptic curve 19
point 19
smooth (point) 19
STDMUL 58
STDSQU 59
SRC (see Single Radix Conversion)
subexponential time 156
supersingular elliptic curve 20
TA (AND delay) 156, 49
Tx (X0R delay) 156, 49
table lookup based reduction (TLBR)166
method
for integers 74
for polynomials 54
algorithms
left-to-right 57
MONMUL63
MONSQU64
right-to-left 57
STDMUL58
STDSQU59
TABLEREAD66
TLBR(see table lookup
based reduction) 53
Toeplitz matrix 102
torsion group 15
trinomial 70, 119
trace function 155
trapdoor 7
trapdoor one-way function 7
type of an Abelian group 14
vector space representation 48
Weierstrass equation 11
Weil theorem 14
word-level division 54
Zech's log table 162